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Abstract 
In the first Chapter I made some introductory remarks on Golden Shares 
(emergence, definition, types, rationale and legal forms), while in the second one I 
referred the forms of Golden Shares adopted within the EU and divided them in 
specific categories depending on their structure. In the third Chapter I analyzed the 
legal framework within which the ECJ resolved the legal issues arisen from Golden 
Shares with an extensive reference to the Communication of the Commission on 
Certain Legal Aspects Concerning Intra EU Investment, the 88/361 EEC Directive, 
the Free Movement of Capital, the Freedom of Establishment, the Public Interest 
Exception and the Proportionality Principle. In the fourth Chapter I underlined the 
economic impacts of Golden Shares with a specific reference to the factors used in the 
assessment of the Oxera. In the fifth Chapter I presented the complexities of the so-
called VW case, which was a decision of fundamental importance for the Golden 
Shares regime concluding with certain comments on all aspects of the case (both legal 
and economic). In the sixth Chapter I remarked the tensions between the Takeover 
Directive and Golden Shares, since the protection of “national” companies from 
hostile takeovers was the predominant reason for the issuance of Golden Shares. In 
the seventh Chapter I pointed out my overall comments on all dimensions of the 
ECJ’s case law in the respective issue, while in the last one I made some proposals 
for the legal and genuine future of Golden Shares, thirteen years after the issuance of 
thefirstdecision.   
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I. Introductory Remarks 
 
Golden shares emerged and pioneered
1
 at the beginning of 1980s in Great 
Britain at Margaret Thatcher’s time and their function has not changed much since 
that time. The main wave of privatizations in the EU took place in 90s, where a fair 
number of States opted to implement legal arrangements which fell outside the logic 
of fully privatized or nationalized companies. Simultaneously, they tried to influence 
significantly the management of the company, despite the fact that they had 
surrendered the majority of their shares to private investors.
2
 The main objective of 
Golden Shares was and remains the protection of State's strategic interests by 
maintaining special rights in privatized companies.  
Typically, Golden Shares afford powers to a public authority that are, 
under the applicable corporate law, only available to a majority shareholder. 
They do so precisely when a Member State terminates the substantial part of its 
financial exposure through the limitation of its stake in the process of privatization, 
while retains powers in the company disproportionate to its (new) minority stake. 
Thus, these arrangements lead to a separation of control and residual risk.3 
Trying to give a precise definition of those arrangements, we could determine 
them as “arrangements in order to identify all legal structures applying to individual 
corporations for the purpose of preserving the influence of a public authority on the 
shareholder structure or the management of that corporation beyond the extent to 
which such influence would be afforded under general corporate and securities law.”4 
Two principal remarks were made by the ECJ in respect to these 
arrangements:  
a. Governments cannot claim that rules concerning the functioning of the 
privatized enterprise result merely from the application of normal company law 
                                                          
1
 See more details in International Book on Privatization, Edward Elgar Publishing (2003), David 
Parker and David S. Saal 
2
 Special Rights of Public Authorities in Privatized EU Companies: the microeconomic impact, Report 
prepared for the European Commission, November 2005 (Oxera) 
3
 Turn of The Tide? The “Golden Shares”. Judgments of The European Court of Justice And The 
Liberalization of the European Capital Markets, German Law Journal, Johannes Adolff 
4
 Ibid. 
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mechanisms, if Member States act in their capacity as a public authority when 
establishing them.
5
 
b. The Treaty provisions apply equally to all restrictions on the Free 
Movement of Capital as they do not distinguish between private undertakings and 
public undertakings.
6
 
As far as there is a restriction it must be justified and proportional. 
There are many reasons why states created and continue to preserve 
Golden Shares. Firstly, strategic privatized companies are important employers and 
tax-payers. Secondly, some companies have large financial power and influence on a 
State's economy. Thirdly, privatized companies have substantial effect on public 
policy and security. Golden shares help States to effectively safeguard these interests
7
 
and protect companies against takeovers. However, the reason of primary importance 
for the development of these prerogatives was the absence of an adequate regulatory 
framework in EU level at the time of their development.
8
 
Golden shares confer divergent special rights, which may be of various types 
and concern different subject matters. For instance: 
(a)Rights to appoint company directors and members of the board
9
 
(b)Rights to limit representation of foreign company directors; 
(c)Rights to veto and decision rights in the general meetings,  
(d)Rights to influence fundamental company decisions, e.g. dissolution of the 
company, mergers and takeovers and any other structural changes, sale of substantial 
assets, amendment of the company's articles of association, liquidation of the 
company; 
(e) Obligation to obtain authorization of the State before certain decisions or 
transactions; 
(f) Rights to influence and restrict the acquisition of the shareholding of the company 
in question.
10
 
                                                          
5
 C-98/01 paragraphs 48 and 49 
6
 C-174/004 paragraph 32 
7
 The Golden Share in Privatized Companies, Droit et Practique Du Commerce International , Alice 
Pezard 
8
 Golden Shares n the EU: Shall They Overcome?, University of Exeter, School of Law, Dirk Gaupp  
9
 The Golden Share in Privatized Companies,  Droit et Practique Du Commerce International, Alice 
Pezard 
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The expression “Golden Shares” refers to the ownership of shares by α State 
or α public body. However, they do not necessarily refer to a real shareholding. 
Provisions of the law or instrument conferring special rights can grant these rights 
even without the requirement to hold a single share. Special rights and privileges 
attached to Golden Shares, may remain even when the State or public body sells its 
shares. Therefore, their existence is possible in fully privatized companies.
11
 
However, in most cases where the right is vested in a share (the Golden share), 
the right normally does not depend only on holding such a share, but also upon such a 
share (still) being held by a state body.
12
 Therefore directly or indirectly these rights 
are granted to the State. 
Golden shares can be provided by law, specific privatization act, like in France 
and Belgium, or provisions of shares' sale contract or shareholders' contract that 
enables its previous owner, the State, to exercise certain degree of control in the 
company. They may arise from the articles of association or administrative procedure, 
like in the UK and the Netherlands.
13
 Rights deriving from Golden Shares may be of 
temporary or permanent nature. Their potential limited duration though does not alter 
the character of the infringement.
14
 
Since Golden Shares derogated from traditional company law,
15
 they have 
raised tensions between protectionist interests of States, Free Movement of Capital 
and the Freedom of Establishment. Before the ECJ rendered its decisions on this 
regime there were attempts to dispute golden shares' provisions under national law. 
When these attempts turned out to be unsuccessful, the legality of Golden Shares was 
disputed by the European Commission.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
10
 Golden Shares: State Control in Privatized Companies: Comparative law, European law and Policy 
Aspects, Stefan Grundman and Florian Moslein 
11
Special Rights of Public Authorities in Privatized EU Companies, The Microeconomic Impact 
(Oxera) 
12
 Golden Shares: State Control In Privatized Companies: Comparative law, European law and Policy 
Aspects, Stefan Grundman and Florian Moslein 
13
 The Golden Share of Privatized Companies, Droit et Practique Du Commerce International, Alice 
Pezard 
 
14
 C-463/00 paragraph 81 
15
 The Rise of The “Golden” Age of Free Movement of Capital: A Comment on The Golden Shares 
Judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, EBOR 2003, Vincent Kronenberger  
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The latter based its legal analysis on the sensible assumption that most of these 
arrangements violated the Treaty as unjustifiable restrictions on the Free Movement 
of Capital and the Freedom of Establishment, on its distinction between 
discriminatory and non-discriminatory restrictions. The first provided for caps 
restricting direct foreign investments which are regarded as incompatible with the EU 
law, while the second class of indirect restrictions constitute a block of 
shares….enables the shareholder…. to participate effectively in the management of 
the company or in its control and apply to all investors irrespective of their 
nationality.
16
 
Even non-discriminatory Special Shares arrangements constituted restrictions 
on the movement of capital and thus needed to be justified. To this end the Court 
added to the provisions on justification in the Treaty a general proportionality test.
17
 
Applying this test the Commission concluded that a fair number of cases did not meet 
these requirements and challenged their validity before the ECJ.
18
  
The disputed cases included caps restricting foreign investments in Portugal
19
, 
caps restricting substantial shareholdings in Portugal and France
20
, exclusive rights of 
appointment in France and Belgium,
21
 as well as exclusive veto rights in France
22
 and 
Belgium. 
II. Privatizations and The Forms Of Golden Shares 
 
Privatizations emerged as global trend in 80s, where a neo-liberal approach 
dominated in the US after the election of Ronald Reagan who implemented in general 
terms the same approach which in the UK started in the late 70s. The philosophy was 
                                                          
16
 Communication of The Commission On Certain Legal Aspects Concerning Intra EU Investment, 
1997, Official Journal C 220, 15-18 
 
17
 C-55/94 paragraph 37 
18
 Communication of The Commission On Certain Legal Aspects Concerning Intra EU Investment, 
1997, Official Journal C 220, 15-18 
19
 C-367/98 paragraph 10 
20
 C-483/99 paragraph 9 
21
 C-503/99 paragraph 9  
22
 C-483/99 paragraphs 9 and 10 
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formulated with a view to reduce public interference within the economy, increasing 
private shareholding and fostering economic efficiency.
23
  
The privatization trend of the late 90s, on the other hand, was primarily due to 
budgetary reasons, as the Maastricht Treaty urged Member States to reduce public 
debts, as a precondition for the introduction of the Euro. Other incentives for 
denationalizations were the will to change ownership structures and to develop capital 
markets.  
Two models of organization were predominant: the model of public law 
entities and the model of private law companies owned by the State. The former did 
not necessarily exclude entrepreneurial freedom, as shown by the British example, 
where State influence was limited to “directions of a general character as to the 
exercise and performance by the Board of their functions in relation to matters 
appearing to the Minister to affect the national interest”. Such formal directions were 
rarely given in practice.  
The second model was largely preferred by Germany, France and Italy as it 
allows mere partial State ownership (“mixed enterprises”) and may, in a holding 
structure, grant control despite small shareholdings.
24
 
However, nowhere in Europe did privatization really put end to State 
interference based on a variety of specific decisions and information rights.
25
 
Several instruments relating to the decision making process were used: 
a. Increased voting powers of particular shares in the general meeting 
(multiple voting rights). Such limitations can be found in Denmark, Sweden (voting 
power multiplied by ten at most) and Finland (voting power multiplied by twenty at 
most). 
b. Shares without voting rights are offered to the public, but all shares carrying 
voting rights are held back by the State. (Produce equivalent effect to the first 
measure). The French legislator frequently opted for this design during the first 
privatization period 1983-85: So-called “certificats d´investissements” served as a 
vehicle to allow State owned enterprises access to private capital. The income from 
shares is segregated from their decision power. 
                                                          
23
 The Thatcher Privatization Legacy: Not Quiet What She Planned?, May 2013,(Oxera) 
24
 Golden Shares-State Control In Privatized Companies: Comparative Law, European Law and Policy 
Aspects, Stefan Grundmann and Florian Moslein    
25
 Ibid. 
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c. Voting caps circumvent the principle of proportionality, but they cannot 
grant State control over a company. A combination with other means is required.
26
 
d. Absolute veto and decision making powers in the general meeting on the 
basis of either general company law or specific legislation.-More radical 
circumvention in the proportionality principle than the foregoing-. The provision of 
the Italian privatization law of 199477 vested a veto right in the minister in charge, 
with respect to fundamental decisions such as: dissolution or transfer of the 
undertaking. 
e. Appointment rights may have various effects and some may merely help to 
get access in internal company information. This is true in France where there is a 
right to appoint representatives of the State to sit on the board of directors, but without 
any voting power. 
Other techniques relating to shareholder structures were the following: 
 a. The board as a decision maker (mainly in the UK). The board of directors 
had to require any person holding at least 15 percent of voting rights to sell the excess 
part of its shares within a certain period (generally 21 days) during which the rights 
were suspended. Otherwise, the board itself was entitled to sell the shares on further 
notice. 
b. The State as a decision maker. In Spain and France, any direct or indirect 
shareholding exceeding ten percent of the capital requires prior approval of the 
minister in charge who acts as the State’s regulatory authority. 
c. Allotment of shares and stipulation of pre-emption rights. The shares are 
allotted to carefully chosen and specified investors. Since 1986, the French minister 
of economy has the power to choose purchasers after a hearing of the privatization 
commission instead of offering the shares to the public. 
Finally, we should refer to some procedural aspects in correlation with the 
principle of proportionality, which gains importance according to the ECJ decisions.  
a. Specificity of aims. The introduction of Golden Shares depends on specified 
yet often widely defined purposes (for instance: “national interest”). Due to this broad 
definition, it is virtually impossible to review whether the authority really has pursued 
such an aim. 
                                                          
26
 See C-112-05 (VW Case)  
14 
 
 
 b. Limitations in scope and time. A time limit also apply, where the 
redemption of Golden Shares, as in Britain, is possible or even imposed, or where the 
special rights automatically terminate, like originally in France. 
c. Rules of procedure. Rules of procedure are not easily identified in this area. 
Belgium is the exception and designed a quite complex system of procedural 
warranties. The advantage, however, is that of a lower degree of state interference. 
All the foregoing categories of Golden Share issues are and may be subjected 
to strict judicial review by the ECJ irrespective of their nature. However, some of 
them adopted in 80s or 90s were altered significantly or were covered behind 
legitimate terms, as the process of integration was boosted in the last twenty years, 
and the common, single market principle did not allow such apparent infringements.   
 
III. Legal Framework 
i. Communication of the Commission On Certain Legal Aspects 
Concerning Intra EU Investment and the 88/361/EEC Directive 
 
In 1997 the European Commission acting as the exclusive guardian of the EU 
Treaties
27
adopted its Communication on Certain Legal Aspects Concerning Intra-EU 
Investment.
28
The aim of 1997 Communication was to give Member States guidelines 
on interpretation and application of Community law concerning measures introduced 
by Member States that constituted obstacles to cross-border investments.
29
 
The Commission underlined the importance of the development of intra EU 
investments in 90s and the contribution of the EU law in the creation of a single 
market, which constituted the decisive factor for the encouragement of intra EU 
investments. However, the European core body detected in some States 
significant attempts intending to monitor and set obstacles in the further 
development of cross border investments in the European Union.  
                                                          
27
 See the Report of the Commission on 5-04-2001, Brussels  
28
 Communication of the Commission on Certain Legal Aspects Concerning Intra EU Investment, 
1997, Official Journal C 220, 15-18 
29
 The legality of Golden Shares Under EC Law, Hanse Law Review, Ivan Kuznetsov 
15 
 
 
Specifically, these attempts were identified mainly in companies providing 
services of general interest, such as network and regulated industries (about 50% of 
the overall number of the detected companies), in competitive industries, such as 
banking, food, tobacco (about 38%) and other miscellaneous, such as defense and 
nuclear sector, which are prescribed precisely by the Treaties.
30
The very majority of 
those companies monitored by Member States through Special Rights were important 
economic actors at national and EU level as indicated by their market capitalization, 
market shares and turnover.   
Some of the disputed State measures have been introduced more recently in 
the context of privatization programmes and constituting decisions of economic 
policy were considered to have fallen within the scope of the exclusive competence of 
the Member States. Therefore, at an initial stage, they were regarded to be 
permissible. 
However, other measures of the same nature taken in the form of economic 
policy actions in the name of the exclusive competence of the States in the respective 
realm aimed to control the Free Movement of Capital and could generate according to 
the present report restrictions on the free circulation at cross-border level. 
Consequently, they might raise compatibility problems with EU legislation, in 
particular with Articles 49 and 63 of the TFEU concerning the Freedom of Capital 
Movements and the Right of Establishment, and hinder the functioning of the Single 
Market
31
. 
The pursued objective of the report was to indicate to national authorities and 
economic operators in Member States, how the Commission interprets the provisions 
of Articles 49 and 63 TFEU on Capital Movements and the Right of Establishment in 
this context. This would help to reduce the risk of divergent legal interpretations and 
would thus, on the one hand enable Member States to shape their policy by taking into 
account Community law in a framework of transparency and mutual trust, and on the 
other hand allow the Community operators concerned to be aware of their rights 
stemming from the Treaty on intra-EU investment.  
                                                          
30
Special Rights In Privatized Companies In The Enlarged Union-A Decade of Full Development, 
Commission Staff Working Document, 22-07-2005 
31
 Official Journal N L 178, 08-07-1988  
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88/361/EEC Directive
32
 could be proved (for the Commission) a useful tool 
in the interpretation of the Fundamental principle of the Free Movement of Capital 
and specifically its Annex I could shed light on the transactions which are regarded 
to fall within the scope of the Free Movement of Capital.
33
 
According to the report : « the heading 'Acquisition . . . of domestic securities . 
. .` includes, among others, the transaction 'acquisition by non-residents` of shares and 
bonds in domestic companies -portfolio investments- on pure financial investment 
grounds, that is, without the aim of exerting any influence in the management of the 
company………”Direct investments” is defined as 'investments of all kinds . . . 
which serve to establish or to maintain lasting and direct links between the person 
providing the capital and the . . . undertaking to which the capital is made available in 
order to carry on an economic activity.
34
 
The concept of those transactions must therefore be understood in its widest 
sense . . . As regards . . . the status of companies limited by shares, there is 
participation in the nature of direct investment where the block of shares held by a 
person . . . enables the shareholder . . . to participate effectively in the management of 
the company or in its control`.
35
 
Thus, the acquisition of controlling stakes as well as the full exercise of the 
accompanying voting rights in domestic companies by other EU investors is also 
considered to be a form of capital movement.…………..At the same time, the 
acquisition of controlling stakes in a domestic company by an EU investor, in addition 
to being a form of capital movement, is also covered under the scope of the right of 
establishment………shall include the right to set up and manage undertakings, under 
the conditions laid down for its own nationals’.36 
 The broad approach taken by the Commission according to this report was 
somewhat problematic since it used an interpretative tool derived from secondary 
                                                          
32
 Communication of the Commission on Certain Legal Aspects Concerning Intra EU Investments, 
1997, Official Journal C 220 
33
 Commission’s and ECJ’s view. See C-367/98 paragraph 37and C-503/99 paragraph 37  
34
 See C-483/99 paragraph 6  
35
 The opposite applies to portfolio investors who have no aim to influence the management of the 
company.  
36
 Communication of the Commission on Certain Legal Aspects Concerning Intra EU Investment, 
1997, Official Journal C 220 
17 
 
 
legislation (foregoing Directive) to shed light on the applicability of a fundamental 
freedom, namely the free movement of capital. The ECJ creating a rigid rule 
reaffirmed the position taken by the Commission on the issue.
37
  
The criticism exerted at the expense of the Commission’s thesis could 
become more intensive, if we took into consideration the division of the investors 
into strategic and passive where only the first one fall within the scope of the 
freedom’s applicability. According to this reasoning portfolio investors –the most 
common type of investors in financial markets- will normally not reach the relevant 
threshold of a cap restricting substantial blockholding and will not be interested in an 
active role regarding the composition and the decisions of the board which the 
Member States influence through their exclusive rights of appointment and exclusive 
veto rights.
38
  
Only strategic investors seeking an active role in the company’s decisions 
are directly affected from Golden Share arrangements and thus the markets for 
corporate control rather than financial markets.
39
 Thereby, according to this approach 
(minority) it would be better if we confined the meaning of the critical term 
“transaction” only in direct investments where the free movement of capital on 
Golden Shares cases ought to have been applied.     
Having made clear the definition of the transactions protected in its view 
under the fundamental principles of Free Movement of Capital and the Freedom of 
Establishment, the Commission classified the measures intending to restrict EU law 
either directly or indirectly in two categories: those with a discriminatory character 
and those with a non-discriminatory. While discriminatory measures, in the view of 
the Commission are contrary to Articles 63 and 49 of the TFEU, unless they are 
covered by the exceptions prescribed in the Treaty, measures belonging to the second 
category are applicable to all investors without distinctions and thus they are not 
automatically contrary to the EU law.
40
 
After the issuance of the foregoing Communication, the direction of EU 
economic policy was clear: In an attempt to complete the internal market, Member 
                                                          
37
 See Joint cases C-163/94, C-165/94, C 250/94 paragraph 34 
38
 Oxera -Special Rights of Public Authorities in Privatized EU Companies, the Microeconomic Impact 
39
 Turn of the Tide? The “Golden Shares” Judgments of The ECJ and The Liberalization of European 
Capital Markets, Johannes Adolff   
40
 The Legality of Golden Shares Under EC Law, Hanse Law Review, Ivan Kuznetsov 
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States were persuaded to abandon their Special Rights either voluntarily or as a result 
of the rulings of the ECJ, while the Commission gave primary attention to this issue 
on future and pending accession proceedings.
41
 
At this point it is worth mentioning to underline the absence of Special Rights 
in privatized companies only in four small States candidates for accession in the EU, 
when the Commission exercised its pre-accessing screening in 1999.
42
The core 
institutional bodies, namely the Commission and the ECJ, played the predominant 
role in this attempt. The first results were encouraging, but the consistency of the 
regulatory framework was to be proven in the following years.
43
 
However, the initiative taken on Golden Shares issues was established in a 
further context aiming to tackle generally cross-border investments restrictions and 
market distortions as manifested in various cases, such as in energy sector.
44
 Trying to 
foster the liberalization and privatization of the internal EU market, the Commission 
set some conditions to be met concerning the sales of State-owned companies (energy 
sector), when the State remains the controlling shareholder. These rules were the same 
as in case of Golden Shares.
45
 
After the publication of the first decisions on Golden Shares the Commission 
made a survey and issued a report for the role of these special rights in Europe and the 
progress made up to 2005.
46
The conclusion was that most Member States achieved 
considerable progress in relinquishing these rights.  
Given the substantial progress in the regulatory framework, mainly through 
the jurisprudence of the ECJ most Member States address nowadays an increasing 
proportion of their general interest considerations through regulation rather than 
through special rights. In many cases Member States have set out a timetable for 
bringing down these barriers, while in others special rights can be justified by 
                                                          
41
 Special Rights In Privatized Companies In The Enlarged Union-A Decade of Full Development, 
Commission Staff Working Document, 22-07-2005 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 Report of the Commission released on 22/07/2005 
44
 Report of the Commission released on 20/06/2001 
45
 ibid 
46
Special Rights In Privatized Companies In The Enlarged Union-A Decade of Full Development, 
Commission Staff Working Document, 22-07-2005 
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exceptions provided in the Treaty or are structured in a way that is compatible with 
EU law.  
 
ii. Free Movement of Capital -art.63 TFEU, ex 58EC- 
 
The principle of the Free Movement of Capital is of high importance for the 
European internal market as it has a positive influence on the development of business 
life within the Community.
47
 It actually constitutes the primary and main legal 
basis for the ECJ’s Golden Shares decisions. 
The Treaty does not determine the term capital movement, which is 
interpreted, as explained before in the analysis of the Communication of the 
Commission, through Capital Movements Directive 88/361/EEC. Nonetheless, this 
fact should not surprise us, since this freedom had been declared directly applicable 
by the 4th Liberalization Directive of 1988 and it was nearly beyond doubt that it 
relates to all transactions enumerated in the respective Annex of this Directive.  
Aside from investments for saving purposes that have always been considered 
as part of this freedom, investments for entrepreneurial purposes (so-called direct 
investments including majority shareholdings) fit in that Annex as well. Thus the 
free movement of capital is concerned with any form of (share) capital.
48
 
A reduction in the attractiveness of a capital movement can amount as a 
restriction as ruled by the ECJ.
49
However, the ECJ is criticized because in some 
cases among of which are those of Belgium and France was quite brief, since it did 
not devote more than a couple of lines to explain its reasoning on why there is a 
restriction in the particular case.
50
Even on the respective issue the Court provides just 
one sentence, as the governments themselves had conceded the restrictive effect of the 
measure.
51
It actually seems to take for granted the existence of a restriction, since 
the Commission initiated the proceedings.  The restriction may lay in any national 
provision of the legislation of the Member State, since the Court did not make any 
                                                          
47
 Report of the Commission released on 22/07/2005 
48
 Golden Shares-State Control In Privatized Companies: Comparative Law, European Law and Policy 
Aspects, Stefan Grundmann and Florian Moslein    
49
 C-222/97 paragraph 20 and 21 
50
 C-503/99 paragraph 39-40 and C-483/99 paragraph 39-42  
51
 C-503/99 paragraph 40 
20 
 
 
distinction on the provisions which can be reviewed (General company law, only 
State owned enterprises or publicly listed?).  
The broad definition concerning the term “national provisions” which can 
breach the fundamental freedoms taken by the Court raised sensible questions such as 
why do not distinguish between national rules making an investment legally 
impossible above a given threshold (i.e. rules concerning the shareholder structure) 
and those making the investment only factually less attractive by curtailing the 
decision making powers of the other shareholders. The distance between the two 
restrictions is discernible and the adopted thesis pending for justification.  
Also, some could argue that many other investments remain open to investors, 
who can in fact take advantage of the capital markets. Golden Share constructions 
have only the effect of making one single investment product (to a certain extent) 
legally unavailable or only de facto less attractive in this (otherwise freely accessible) 
market. It might well be justified to force governments to maximize privatization 
gains by choosing an attractive form and therefore to take full advantage of possible 
gains in efficiency related to such privatization. 
Questions of the above described kind seem to be sensible, but they were not 
answered by the Court raising questions on the way that the Commission may affect 
the ECJs decision in the attempt to attain EU targets, such as the completion of the 
internal market.  
However, except for the legitimate deviations provided in art. 65 TFEU (ex 
58), reasons of public policy as determined in the foregoing subsection may 
constitute, according to Camara, legitimate deviations from the Free Movement of 
Capital and justify the restriction as long as they are not discriminatory (on the basis 
of the investors’ nationality), not discretionary (on the basis of publicly known 
criteria) and proportionate (subject to the principle of proportionality) to the pursued 
objective.
52
These criteria adopted by the Commission too, emphasized the need to 
safeguard legal certainty and transparency jeopardized by these restrictions.
53
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The Court following in principle the above mentioned criteria
54
decided on the 
legitimacy of the invoked public policy reasons ad hoc. Some indicative examples are 
the following: 
 In C-483/99 Commission v France the Court ruled that: Although 
French measures aimed at safeguarding supplies of petroleum products 
in the event of crisis which is considered to fall within the scope of the 
legitimate public interes, the restrictive nature of the adopted prior 
authorization procedure was not proportionate to the pursued objective. 
The Court stated that the provisions concerned would discourage 
investors from other Member States, thus violating both the principle 
of the Freedom of Establishment and the Free Movement of Capital. – 
France failed to comply with the proportionality principle, despite the 
legitimacy of restriction-.  
 In C-503/99 Commission v Belgium the Court accepted (the unique 
case) the legitimacy of the restriction grounded on public policy 
reasons: The Belgian opposition procedure was compatible with the 
free movement of capital principle because it was found to constitute a 
legitimate justification on the basis of public security. The Court 
stated that the measures “fall undeniably within the ambit of a 
legitimate public interest”. In addition the ECJ underlined that the 
scheme could effectively achieve the objective and it was 
demonstrated that the measure was narrowly tailored to achieve the 
objective without excessive restriction.  
 In C-367/98 Commission v Portugal the Court ruled that: “the 
financial interests cannot constitute a valid justification for 
restrictions on the capital market”. In the following years the Court 
reaffirmed that economic grounds can never serve as a justification for 
restrictions prohibited by the Treaty.
55
 –The Portuguese Government 
failed to invoke even a reason falling within the ambit of public policy 
exception-. 
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The measures that imply a discriminatory
56
treatment on the basis of 
nationality are prohibited. As regards non-discriminatory measures, they are 
permitted by EU Law in so far as they are justified by imperative requirements in the 
general interest and they are proportionate to the achievement of that interest. This 
interpretation of the Commission has been confirmed in a series of recent landmark 
rulings by the European Court of Justice among of which are the foregoing. 
However, we should pay attention to the implied discriminatory character of a 
restriction. Namely, the restriction may have a discriminatory effect in practice, 
even if the particular special right does not appear to contain a discriminatory element 
in the paper. For example, the provision which authorizes the government to block 
takeovers in general, although seems to be non-discriminatory, in practice may have 
the adverse effect, if the government applies the provision only in respect to foreign 
bidders, while disregarding it for the domestic.
57
  
 
iii. Freedom of Establishment -art 49 TFEU, ex 43 EC- 
 
The acquisition of the controlling stakes in a domestic company by a European 
investor from another Member State is undoubtedly covered by this fundamental 
freedom.
58
According to the later, nationals of other EU Member States should be free 
to acquire controlling stakes, to exercise voting rights and manage domestic 
companies under the same conditions laid down in a given Member State for its own 
nationals.  
Although, in direct and portfolio investments basically art. 63 TFEU applies, 
in the first category of investments (direct) article 49 TFEU applies too.
59
 For 
example, the acquisition of company shares requires a capital movement, but can 
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easily involve establishment, especially if the acquisition is big enough to give the 
purchaser control rights over the company.
60
 
The aforementioned instance is only one among others where the Freedom of 
Establishment and the Free Movement of Capital may overlap in their application. 
The confusion becomes even more intensive as long as we took into consideration the 
second subparagraph of article 49 TFEU, which provides that the right of 
establishment is subject to the provisions of the chapter related to capital, while article 
65 paragraph 2 TFEU underlines that the provisions of this Chapter (capital 
movements) shall be without prejudice to the applicability of the restrictions on the 
right of establishment which are compatible with the Treaties. 
These provisions imply, as the ECJ repeatedly ruled (see in the following 
analysis) that the protection offered in case of concur application of those freedoms in 
Golden Shares is confined only to one of them, namely the Free Movement of 
Capital.  
Nonetheless, the adverse position at issue was expressed by the Advocate 
General in Baars Case who argued that: “The reservations do not signify that conduct 
can be protected only under one of these fundamental freedoms. Were any reference 
to capital movements ipso facto to preclude application of the chapter on the freedom 
of establishment, that fundamental freedom would lose any practical meaning, since 
establishment in another Member State generally involves a transfer of 
capital”.61Therefore, according to his reasoning, the Court had to choose the freedom 
which was more amenable in the given circumstances. 
However, according to the ECJ’s consistent case-law, the second 
(establishment) is inextricably linked with the first,
62
which is regarded practically 
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the exclusive
63
legal basis for scrutinizing intra EU investments restricted through 
Golden Shares.
64
 This outcome is founded upon the subsequent arguments:
65
 
a. Both freedoms apply to the exit from the State of origin as well as to the 
entry into the host State. 
b. Both of them are considered to prohibit, not only direct discrimination, but 
also the restrictions in a broader sense (non-discriminatory). 
c. In both cases, deviations can be justified by mandatory reasons of public 
good (in the majority of the infringements) in the light of proportionality principle. 
d. However, there are two significant differences between them:   
Only the Free Movement of Capital applies to third States and Member 
States alike. Even if art 64 TFEU allows restrictions, this permission perhaps not 
apply to privatization laws that national legislators wish to adopt henceforth. It 
follows that direct investment from third countries liberalized.
66
 
In the foregoing framework, the ECJ in its recent case law tried to delineate 
the distinction between the two freedoms
67
and give concrete guidance as to which of 
them is applicable in case of overlap. If a measure concerns portfolio investments then 
exclusively the Free Movement of Capital is applicable, while for measures applied to 
“control” situations in direct investments both of freedoms are applicable (critical is 
the threshold required for control), even if primarily the establishment is concerned.  
Therefore, the first (capital) has far broader scope of application than the second as 
in portfolio investments and direct (below the control threshold) the Free Movement 
of Capital applies exclusively, while above that threshold (in direct investments) both 
of the freedoms apply. The Freedom of Establishment thus applies only in direct 
“control investments” simultaneously with the Free Movement of Capital.68 
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The application of these fundamental freedoms leads in parallel outcomes 
with regard to substantial issues, but one of them (capital) has broader scope of 
application and therefore is more useful. Hence, the free movement of capital is the 
benchmark in Golden Shares issues, despite the acknowledgment both by the 
Commission and the ECJ of the concurrent applicability of the Freedom of 
Establishment, except for the previous case of Italy (C-326/07).
69
  
Additionally, the Court in the context of the foregoing deliberations might 
have opted to rely on its wealth existing precedent to decide on the Golden Share 
cases
70
, indicating that some cases infringe both freedoms, and the reason for the 
Court's application of one body of law over the other may be apparent only by 
considering the development of the relevant precedent.
71
 
Furthermore, from a practical point of view, it is understandable that the 
Court after having addressed the infringement on the Free Movement of Capital found 
no need for further and separate examination of the restrictions in the light of the 
Freedom of Establishment.
72What’s more, it may not wish to review such a delicate 
issue in EU Law like the separation and allocation of competences (or the division of 
powers) between EU institutions and Member States. 
73
 
At this point it could be fruitful to remark that the opposite opinion was the 
one adopted by the AG, Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, in all cases (where made suggestions) 
except for the German one, namely that the restriction on the Free Movement of 
Capital was merely incidental to the restriction on the Freedom of Establishment.
74
 
However, its impact was trivial since it had been dismissed by the Court consistently 
for approximately a decade, until 2009, when the ECJ rendered its C-326/07 adopting 
partially his position. 
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The ECJ
75
in its recent decision doubted if the exclusivity of article 63 TFEU is 
still useful for reviewing all golden arrangements’ issues. The Court reached a new 
outcome and tried to lift the freedom of establishment from secondary to first 
position as the latter was regarded the solely legal basis for reviewing the veto right 
granted in favor of the Italian government, contrary to other decisions taken in the 
respective issue.
76
 
Pursuant to this new, but temporary, as we see thesis 
77
 there are some 
categories of Golden Shares, namely veto rights in any of their taken legal form, 
which will no longer be judged on the basis of article 63 TFEU, but on the Freedom 
of Establishment
78
basis in view of their capacity to obstruct a shareholder from 
exerting a definite influence on the company’s decisions and to determine its 
activities.
79
  
The rationale behind the adoption of the new thesis is not the fact that veto 
rights do no longer deter possible investors from investing in a company, but the 
dissuasion of investors is regarded as the inevitable impact of the restriction that veto 
rights impose on the Freedom of Establishment. The Court consistent with the 
approach that, if a national measure breaches two or more fundamental freedoms, 
only one of them is to be applied when it is clear from the circumstances that one of 
them is entirely secondary to the other and can be linked to it,
80
 remade its previous 
case law on the applicability of the free movement of capital in relation to veto right. 
 Another predominant underlying purpose of amending ECJ’s case law on 
the matter was “[…] to prevent undertakings in strategic sectors from falling into the 
hands of financial groups of dubious solvency from outside the Community which may 
have objectives incompatible with the policies of the Member States as expressed by 
AG Colomer and based on certain legal grounds.
81
 
However, these grounds are not safe and effective enough to safeguard their 
pursued objective. Firstly, non EU nationals can easily attain their objective in another 
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way through registration of their place of administration within the EU and therefore 
can be treated as nationals of Member States. Secondly, the decision may give 
Member States the legal basis to misuse Golden Shares for protectionist purposes.   
Besides, the ensuing case law
82
 came to refute the position of the ECJ taken 
in the recent litigation against Italy concerning the applicability of article 49 TFEU 
instead of article 63 TFEU in veto cases. What’s more, other special rights of similar 
nature, such as the right to appoint directors of the board in the company which were 
regarded to fall primarily within the ambit of article 43 were not reaffirmed.
83
 The 
Court returned in its consistent thesis, namely the exclusive practically 
applicability of the Free Movement of Capital as the legal basis for reviewing 
Golden Shares without making any distinctions in veto or appointment rights.    
iv. Public Interest Exception 
 
Despite its usefulness as justification for the restrictions imposed on the Free 
Movement of Capital, little positive guidance exists for its content and the existing 
case-law is limited.
84
 However, the following case is indicative and meaningful to 
shed initially light on the issue.  
Case C-54/99, Association Eglise de scientologie de Paris and Scientology 
International Reserves Trust v The Prime Minister 
New legislative rules governing financial relations with foreign countries were 
adopted on 14 February 1996 in France. These rules maintained, inter alia, a system 
of prior authorization in the case of a foreign investment that is such as to represent 
a threat to public policy, public health or public security. The Conseil d'État has 
referred to the Court a question concerning the compatibility of such a system with 
the Community-law principle of the Free Movement of Capital. 
First of all, the Court declared that a national provision which subjects a direct 
foreign investment to prior authorization constitutes a restriction on the Free 
Movement of Capital even if authorization is deemed to have been obtained quite 
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shortly, namely one month after receipt of the request and even though no penalty is 
predicted. 
Such a derogation from the fundamental principle of the Free Movement of 
Capital can, according to the Court, be justified only by requirements of public 
policy or public security. These grounds must be strictly interpreted and must be 
available to review by Community institutions.  
Public security justification was initially considered to include dangers and 
risks to the very existence of the State and its institutions.
85
 This approach changed 
later on, since the Court referred to a decision on the Free Movement of Goods,
86
 
where there was a specific reference to the public interest in the sense of public 
utilities.  
Considering that the reason and even the wording of the reason for the 
justification of the restriction of the Free Movement of Capital are identical to the one 
of the Free Movement of Goods, we could conclude that public utility may amount to 
a possible justification. The general economic policy purposes though cannot amount 
to a permissible justification.
87
   
The Court tried in its finding to clarify the conditions under which the public 
policy exception may qualify as a permissible and proportionate restriction 
(suitable and not go beyond what is necessary) in the Free Movement of Capital in 
non-discriminatory cases which are not regarded by definition as incompatible with 
the EU Law.
88
 
First of all, it should be observed, that while Member States are still free to 
determine the requirements of public policy and public security pursuant to their 
national needs, these grounds must be construed strictly in the Community context 
as derogations from the fundamental principle of the Free Movement of Capital, so 
that their scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State without 
any control by the Community institutions.
89
  
Moreover, public policy and public security may be acceptable, only if there is 
a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of the 
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society
90
and any derogations from the fundamental principles of EU law must not be 
misapplied
91
so as, in fact, to serve purely economic ends. What’s more, any person 
affected by a restrictive measure based on such a derogation must have access to 
legal remedy.
92
 
Secondly, measures which restrict the Free Movement of Capital may be 
justified on public-policy grounds only if they are necessary for the protection of the 
interests that they are intended to guarantee and only in so far as the pursued 
objectives cannot be attained by less restrictive measures.
93
 
In the present case, however, the substance of the system in question is that 
prior authorization is required for every direct foreign investment which represents a 
threat to public policy and public security, without any more detailed and precise 
definition. Thus, the investors concerned are given no indication regarding the 
specific circumstances in which prior authorization is required. Such lack of 
accuracy does not enable individuals to be informed of the extent of their rights 
and obligations deriving from Article 65b of the TFEU.  
The reasons invoked by Member States usually have the following content:  
Governments want to ensure that the control of the company will not fall in hostile 
hands or to ascertain that the company retains its purpose and place of its 
incorporation or to prevent the sale of its core assets or to ensure the compliance of 
new owners policy with the sales agreement or to safeguard public defense and 
security or to protect sensitive sectors of the economy.
94
 
 
v. The Principle of Proportionality
95
 
 
The questions of whether a national rule fits for the intended purpose and 
whether it is the least restrictive measure are both questions which concern details of 
national law. Through the application of this fundamental principle the Court in fact 
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penetrates into the substance of the national provision in question reviewing its 
utmost purpose. Despite the depth of the scrutinizing achieved through this tool, 
there is still a significant danger which is to be regulated by the jurisprudence of the 
ECJ, namely the criteria composing the principle and the strict requirements of their 
applicability, The purpose is apparent: Not only will we make the decisions more 
foreseeable, but also we will confine the scope of ECJ’s discretion. 
Firstly, the national measure must be suitable for securing the objective which 
it pursues and must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it. With respect 
to the last criterion we should consider whether the least restrictive measure had been 
chosen
96
 and therefore three issues are of relevant significance: the limits of the 
control power, the design of (administrative) proceedings and the possibility for 
judicial review.
97
 
For the first criterion, the conditions of the State’s intervention and the 
available measures which amount to such an intervention are to be known before their 
applicability in order to ensure legal certainty. The French decision is illustrative on 
the issue, as the intervention of the State authority did not depend upon specific 
conditions and therefore it was possible in any case, even if not necessary for 
safeguarding the petroleum supplies.
98
 Henceforth, administrative action is allowed 
only for specified purposes and must only be taken with respect to specified objective 
criteria in order to enable possible investors to anticipate the exercise of these special 
rights on behalf of the State. 
In respect to the second criterion, the standards that the Court imposed in 
administrative proceedings are quite strict. According to its settled case-law, a 
system of an ex post opposition is preferable for reasons of legal certainty instead of 
prior authorization.
99
The reason why the Court upheld the restriction imposed in case 
of Belgium was that the period available for the administration to express its 
opposition was short and the latter had to be expressed on a certain form. Therefore, 
transparency and legal certainty was sufficiently guaranteed by the Belgian State. 
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The last criterion of judicial review
100exercised upon the authority’s decision 
was essential for safeguarding legal certainty. Otherwise, the discretion given to the 
State body might have been used for reasons unrelated to the pursued objective. The 
last criterion draws the line between the duty of the authority to specify the attainable 
purpose or to justify its decision on certain grounds and the abuse or misuse or excess 
of its power. In any case no review of the substance is allowed. 
The Court at this point has to take various elements into consideration in 
order to determine whether the least restrictive measure was chosen without 
making a priori comparative analysis of the less restrictive one. Afterwards, it has 
to assess the interaction among them and their suitability in correlation with a clearly 
and narrowly described objective. The outcome must be not only transparent, but also 
well structured on the basis that the main aim of a private undertaking is the 
orientation of the profit, while public interest must be seen as an exception. 
Therefore, the ECJ scrutinizes Golden Share restrictions in two levels: At the 
first stage, the restriction must be justified by reasons of public good which 
should be specified as they make the investment less attractive. The general 
invocation of economic policy reasons doe not suffice, since the primary objective is 
to safeguard the freedom of private initiative within a market economy 
framework.
101
Besides, as pointed out by the Commission special powers cannot be 
used merely to aid the economic performance of the companies.
102
 
At the second stage, the Court reviews the specific design of the national 
provision at stake. Proportionality plays an important role at this point. The 
Commission regards that the national legislator must prove that no other design would 
have been less intrusive. Instead, the Court regards that the State set a 
disproportionate and illegitimate restriction when there is evidence that a less 
restrictive measure was indeed possible and would have granted an equal standard of 
protection. 
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IV. Economic Impact (Oxera Report) 
 
Commission assigned to Oxera the task to conduct a study on public 
investment restrictions in EU companies and the economic (purely) impacts of 
Golden Shares. The conclusions of this survey were the following: 
i. Voting rights and controlling powers carried by certain shares in most 
cases increase market value of those shares, expect for the case that the State 
retains them and the adverse effect is identified. In general terms, voting premia 
and value of control blocks differ depending on various factors such as the 
concentration/dispersion of shares in the firm or the degree of competition in a given 
market. To sum up, market does value control rights and premia are paid for shares 
with multiple voting powers, but in case of State control the scene is different as 
public authorities are susceptible to options with less political cost which affect 
corporate governance and decrease the firm value.     
ii. The effects of Golden Shares are considered to be equally detrimental to the 
effects of other restrictions imposed on international investments and capital 
movements. These restrictions are regarded to create additional costs on affected 
companies and investors, segmenting and distorting financial markets. For 
example, if the State is able to regulate the quantity of shares owned by foreigners, 
markets for domestic and foreign investors will become separate. Therefore, the price 
of the equity available to domestic investors will be lower to the equivalent for 
foreigners, as there will be two classes of shares partially accessible for each category 
of investors. 
iii. One of the usual rights conferred through Golden Shares is the blocking 
power of the shareholder against hostile takeovers. But, the relationship between 
those anti-takeover provisions and company performance is negative deterring 
perspective investors from making bids to target companies where those powers are 
retained.
103
 The conclusion is based on the assumption that managers may take 
advantage of the increased lack of control and do not maximize the shareholder 
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value.
104
By contrast, other (minority) experts argue that decreasing the takeover threat 
for a company, we may enhance its productive efficiency and firm value.
105
    
iv. The transfer of ownership from State to private investors increases 
financial and operational performance of the company and its productivity. 
Authors have found that private ownership leads to higher rates of productivity 
growth and declining of costs on the long-run,
106
 while the same occurs with profit 
margins and size of the workforce,
107
 after the privatization process. Adversely, 
voting caps, veto and other special rights impeding corporate governance decisions 
make corporate control less effective, the governance standards poorer and the overall 
performance of the company negative.  
To reaffirm the reasoning of the foregoing results we could remark the 
outcome of another research which has also demonstrated that the presence of special 
rights in a privatized company has a negative effect on the performance of this 
company. The failure to transfer complete control and to exercise the right incentives, 
combined with the uncertainty concerning government intervention and the cost of 
imposing certain conditions, has an impact on the market valuation of the company 
and may result in an under-pricing of the company’s shares.108   
Besides, special rights may provide a shelter for the government from market 
discipline resulting into poorer corporate governance. On the other hand, 
privatizations far from any special shares increase the profitability of the company, 
improve operating efficiency and encourage capital investments.  
In any case, the severity of the economic impact of Golden Shares is not only 
associated with the type of the vested special right, but also with the design and the 
structure of the right as adopted by a certain State. For instance, a compulsory cap of 
investors’ shareholding is regarded more restrictive than the right of the public 
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authority to veto certain decisions, despite the fact that they belong as form of 
restrictions in the same category, which control changes in ownership and shareholder 
structure of the company.  
Additionally, the restrictiveness of the measure depends upon the degree of 
discretion exercised by the public authority, the threshold level that leads in the 
application of the cap or veto, the range and significance of decisions that the special 
right may affect, the kind of power granted to the State (absolute veto or multiple 
voting rights), the conditional or unconditional intervention of the State, the time 
period during which the right is available to the State. For example, a cap of 10% 
which triggers the authorization procedure is considered less stringent than a cap of 
5% or the adoption of a system based on post opposition is preferable than one of 
prior authorization. 
Despite Golden Shares’ significant negative impacts on economic field, we 
should not overestimate them as far as their consequences in the performance of 
EU companies are concerned. According to the organization for the economic 
cooperation and development (OECD), the most open countries regarding the barriers 
to direct foreign investments in the industrialized world are EU countries. However, 
the Commission aims at making the EU an even friendlier regime to perspective 
investors and thus Oxera’s report should be taken seriously into consideration. 
V. C-112/05: Commission of European Communities v Federal 
Republic of Germany (Volkswagen Case) 
 
I decided to comment this decision of the ECJ not only due to its legal 
complexities as we see in the subsequent analysis, but also due to its fundamental 
economic and symbolic impact within the EU. The VW decision fixed the legal 
framework which was adopted previously in the Golden Shares regime and tried to go 
even further setting questions were to be answered by the future case law.  
i. Breach of the Free Movement of Capital. The provisions of German 
legislation, which were used by the parties to support their views in the given case 
before the European Court of Justice, were:  
a. Paragraph 134(1) of the Law on public limited companies. The provision 
permitted the designation of a progressive or absolute ceiling, which could be set by 
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the articles of association, in case of unquoted companies, where one shareholder 
holds a large number of shares. The legitimate capability of the association could 
result in the restriction of the voting rights of the shareholder in question no matter if 
the general rule of the voting power of the shareholder depended upon the par value 
of the shares or the in case of no par value upon the number of the shares held in the 
given case.  
b. Also, article 101(2) provided that: “'The right to appoint representatives to 
the supervisory board shall be laid down in the articles of association and such rights 
may be granted only to specified shareholders or to the holders of specified 
shares….In aggregate, the rights of representation granted shall not exceed one third 
of the number of members of the supervisory board appointed by the shareholders in 
accordance with the law or the articles of association.” 
The relevant provisions of the Volkswagen law, which constituted the basis 
for the legal dispute between the Commission and the German Republic (Law of 21 
July 1960 as amended on 6
th
 September 19650), namely the law governing the 
privatization of equity in this huge German company, were the following: 
   a. The right of the Federal State and the Land of Lower Saxony each to 
appoint two representatives to the undertaking’s supervisory board, as soon as they 
hold shares in the company;  
 b. The limitation on the exercise of voting rights to 20% of the share capital 
in the case where the holding of a shareholder exceeds that percentage; and  
c. The increase to 80% of the shares represented by the majority required to 
pass resolutions of the General Assembly of shareholders, which under the Law on 
public limited companies required only a majority of 75%.  
The Court found that there was breach of article 56 (1) EC as in the definition 
of the Free Movement of Capital we should list the investments of any kind 
undertaken by natural or legal persons and which serve to establish or maintain lasting 
and direct links between the persons providing the capital and the undertakings to 
which that capital is made available in order to carry out an economic activity.  
Annex I 88/361 EEC constituted a considerable tool for the specification of 
the meaning of the fundamental freedom, since there was no precise and clear 
definition in European Primary Legislation.
109
 Also, the Court remarked that lasting 
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economic links presupposes that the shares held by the shareholder enable him, either 
pursuant to the provisions of the national laws relating to companies limited by shares 
or in some other way, to participate effectively in the management of that company or 
in its control.
110
 
Specifically, the Court found the following: 
a. Capping of voting rights up to 20%. The Commission maintained that this 
rule is in opposition with the requirement that there should be a certain degree of 
proportion between shareholding and the related voting rights. Even if the capping of 
voting rights is a common instrument of company law, there is a considerable 
difference between the State making possible to insert such an instrument into a 
company's articles of association (Case in German law for non-quoted public 
companies) and the State regulating in its capacity of legislator a provision to this end 
for one undertaking solely and ultimately for its own benefit, as the case with 
Paragraph 2(1) of the VW Law.
111
  
There is, therefore, a difference between a power made available to 
shareholders, who are free to decide whether they will take advantage of it or not and 
the obligation imposed to them through the pertinent legislation without giving them 
the possibility to derogate from it.  
b. Resolutions of the general meeting require 80% of the voting rights. 
The decisions that the company may take concern various issues among of which are 
capital increase or decrease and the amendment of the company’s articles of 
association. The law of public liability companies requires in general a majority equal 
to 75%, but allows the shareholders to increase or decrease that percentage. By 
contrast, the VW law imposes an 80% threshold in the form of law and the 
shareholders cannot deviate from that regulation, since they cannot alter the 
provisions of a law. 
The conclusion of the combined interpretation of the aforementioned 
observations is that any shareholder holding 20% of the company’s capital acquires 
blocking power against the other shareholders, since the legislation granted this 
prerogative which can be deprived or amended only by a typically equal or superior 
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law. According to the information provided to the Court, the Land of Lower Saxony 
retains the critical interest of 20% in the company.
112
 
 Taking into consideration all these thoughts, the Court concluded that the State 
created a legal framework enabling it to exercise decisive influence in the decisions 
and the management of the company without holding any significant and proportional 
to these powers amount of shares.  
In other words, an investment of a relatively reduced value for the German 
Federal State allowed the latter to block certain decisions and indirectly to hinder the 
effective participation of possible investors in the management and control of the 
company. Thus, this framework is liable for deterring direct investments of investors 
from other Member States and there is breach of the Free Movement of Capital. 
c. Appointment of two representatives to the supervisory board by each of 
the Federal State and the Land of Lower Saxony. 
The Commission submits that Paragraph 4(1) of the VW Law, allowing the 
Federal State and the Land of Lower Saxony each to appoint two representatives to 
the supervisory board of Volkswagen, if they are shareholders in the company, 
derogates from the rule prescribed in Paragraph 101(2) of the Law on public limited 
companies, to the effect that such a right may be included only into the articles of 
association (not legislation) and may concern only one third of the members of the 
supervisory board appointed by the shareholders, that is three representatives in the 
case of Volkswagen.  
According to the Commission, by limiting the ability of the other shareholders 
to participate effectively in the management and control of that company, Paragraph 
4(1) constitutes a restriction on the Free Movement of capital.
113
 
While German company law assigns to the supervisory board the task of 
monitoring the company’s management and of providing reports to the shareholders 
for that purpose, it confers significant powers to the board, since performing its 
monitoring task it can appoint or dismiss the members of the executive board. 
Also, both the German republic and the Land of Lower Saxony according to 
VW law can appoint an overall number of four out of 10 representatives, despite the 
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fact that only one of them holds interests in the company and its total shares are only 
20% of the holding. 
Besides, the right remains at the disposal of the foregoing shareholders as long 
as they hold interests in the company no matter if their shares’ stake suffices or not.  
Thus, the right of appointment conferred on the Federal State and the Land of 
Lower Saxony enables them to participate in the activity of the supervisory board in a 
disproportionate way compared to the equivalent afforded to a normal shareholder. 
For the foregoing reasons, the VW law enables the State to exercise a certain 
level of influence which exceeds the limits that its holding in the company imposes in 
compliance with the proportionality principle. The other shareholders are restricted to 
an equal extend since they are unable to participate in the company with the view to 
establish lasting and direct economic links and thus take part effectively in the control 
or the management of the company. 
Once the Court had admitted that there is a breach of fundamental freedom, it 
reviewed the imposed restriction on the basis of the existence of overriding public 
policy reasons invoked by the German State. 
  The criterion is the following: “In the absence of such Community 
harmonization, it is in principle for the Member States to decide on the degree of 
protection which they wish to afford to such legitimate interests and on the way in 
which that protection is to be achieved. They may do so, however, only within the 
limits set by the Treaty and must, in particular, observe the principle of 
proportionality, which requires that the measures adopted be appropriate to secure 
the attainment of the objective which they pursue and not go beyond what is necessary 
in order to attain it”.114 
The ultimately adopted thesis was that the German State failed to explain 
precisely why it is necessary and appropriate to hold a strengthened position in the 
capital of that company for the invoked effective protection of VW workers and the 
minority shareholders.  
What’s more, the German side failed to justify the reason why statutory 
guarantees are required for the protection of general interest in case of a large 
company as VW, especially where these guarantees are not necessary for other 
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companies subjected to general company law despite its equal to VW size and 
power.
115
 
ii. Breach of the Freedom of Establishment. The national provisions 
which apply both to nationals of the Member State where the disputed company was 
established and to nationals of another Member-State who exercise some degree of 
influence in company’s decisions determining its activities contradict the Freedom of 
Establishment as provided in art 49 TFEU.
116
 Therefore “Golden-Shares” should be 
reviewed on the basis of their compatibility with this freedom too, but in a 
complementary basis as this approach stems from the case-law of the ECJ.
117
 
In the given case, the restrictions imposed by VW law could constitute an 
infringement of the fundamental freedom
118
as long as the Commission afforded a 
sufficient ground for backing up its arguments.
119
However, it failed to provide the 
suitable justifications to reason its opinion and therefore its initial allegation for 
breach of art. 49 TFEU was dismissed.  
iii. Opinion of the Advocate General. Although the present case does 
not really come within the ambit of Golden Shares (strict sensu) because the special 
rights in question are not attached to the shares held by public bodies, it is not 
possible to accept a reductionist view of how these rights must be construed. In fact, 
the decisive factor is not whether the excessive rights are formally attached to certain 
shareholdings, but rather whether these rights are conferred in a privileged manner to 
the extent that they dissuade investors, particularly foreign investors.
120
 
 The AG contrary to the ECJ regards that the principal and not the 
complementary legal basis for the infringement of EU law by “Golden Shares” 
granted by certain Member States is art. 49 TFEU and not art. 63 TFEU.
121
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His opinion delivered to the ECJ before the issuance of the relevant decision 
and was completely in line with the equivalent of the Court’s findings at the 
issuea of the interpretation of 88/361EEC in correlation with art 63 TFEU, the 
combination of the two criteria (capping of voting rights in 20% in combination 
with resolutions requiring 80% of the voting rights reasoned the blocking power of 
the State) to justify the infringement,  the dismissal of the allegation for the existence 
of overriding public policy reasons. Despite the initial remark of the Advocate 
General that the legal basis of the breach is not art. 63, but article 49 TFEU, in 
all the other issues upon which the infringement was founded there was absolute 
identification between the AG and the Court. 
iv. Remarks 
 
i). The outcome of the so called “Volkswagen case” was highly anticipated by the 
vast majority of not only the literature, where the case in its legal aspects was well 
founded (even not very strongly) and could have opened the Pandora’s box as we 
mention later on, but also the international economic players in automobile sector 
among of which Porsche was the predominant one. The latter increased its stake in 
Volkswagen to just above 30 percent in early 2007, thereby expecting the fall of the 
Volkswagengesetz. Porsche’s goal was said to be the acquisition of the total control in 
VW, once the VW law was abolished.
122
 
Thus, divergent parties for different reasons were looking forward to be 
informed for the outcome of the case creating a surrounding climate, which could 
affect the judgment. VW law was in force for about 50 years and the outcome was 
expected to bring about radical changes in one of the biggest companies of the EU, 
controlled by the largest economy of the EU which was ultimately Commission’s 
main sponsor. 
ii) The ECJ issued a decision in compliance with its previous cases where 
the gist of them was that the ECJ did not accept the decisive influence of the State in 
private companies that would allow the State – without a justifying proportionate 
reason – to receive preferred treatment above the other shareholders. In other words, a 
violation of the fundamental freedoms was always found in cases where the State 
acted qua regulator rather than qua market operator.  
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The Court did not distinguish between provisions
123
 that were part of 
legislation or that entered into the articles of association of the company.
124
 Nor did 
the Court require discrimination in order to find a violation of Article 63 TFEU.
125
 
Rather it has become clear that Article 63 TFEU covers also measures that may 
impede capital movements, even though they are not discriminatory. The decisive 
factor that constituted a restriction of the fundamental freedoms was that the 
respective “special right” has always been in direct favor to the State itself in its 
function as market regulator.
126
 
iii) In the present case, there was a distinctive characteristic making the review 
of the case more dangerous and delicate. VW law constituted a genuine public 
regulation provided only rules for general company law and there was no reference 
for the State as the beneficiary of these rules. Thereby the relevant rules, at least 
the capping and the voting majority, applied to all shareholders on equal terms.    
In other words, what the Court had to scrutinize here were genuine rules of 
company law – admittedly deviating from the general rules, but making changes for 
the interior management of VW- without any public authority’s interference per se. 
Other private shareholders – irrespective of the Member State they came – could have 
benefited from the provisions in the same way as the German authorities could.  
The Court might have opened the Pandora’s Box of assessing the 
compatibility of every provision of national company law concerning the 
involvement of the State or not (only private persons) in relation to the Free 
Movement of Capital. 
As precisely pointed out for the eventually avoided -for some commentators- 
“mistake”: “In fact, this development threatens to morph into a ‘substantive control’ 
or ‘quality control’ of domestic company law in a way that the Court not only 
assesses questions of cross-border discrimination or market access, but rather 
measures the company law as designed by each Member State against the Court’s 
own substantive values”.127  
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The same “mistake” avoided in the specific case was made clearly in the 
interpretation of another freedom in the so-called Dassonville case
128
, where the broad 
interpretation adopted by the Court led in reviewing every provision of national law 
as potential obstacle to the Free Movement of Goods. If the Court had adopted the 
same broad approach in respect to the Free Movement of Capital then it would have 
to correct its interpretation as in case of Keck.
129
 By contrast the Court could take 
the maximum effectiveness of the freedom as long as it adopted the broader one. 
In the second case, two counter arguments can be put forward. Firstly, 
fundamental freedoms’ primary objective is to facilitate cross-border private 
autonomy. Secondly, the EU Law should take into consideration the overall context of 
private law in question and its internal coherence without being able to penetrate 
indistinctly at various points of private law.  
However, these arguments proposed by predominant commentators depicted 
their previously expressed fears and can be rejected on the following grounds: Very 
rarely the danger of system discontinuities convinced the ECJ to refrain from finding 
a fundamental freedom being violated.
130
Besides, private law is a useful tool for the 
facilitation of cross border activities and thus it should be formed in accordance with 
the EU Law which regulates the former.   
In its analysis the Court came to an interesting, but imperfect -in my 
opinion- conclusion. Associating the two provisions contained in VW law 
concerning the capping and the voting rights (80%) implied that the combination of 
the two restrictions was the “trick” which permitted the German State to control the 
decisions of the company, since the Land of Lower Saxony possessed a considerable 
amount of shares. However, the conclusion of the Court could arguably be assumed to 
have been different if the Land would have sold its shares too and a private investor 
had purchased them, since the ECJ ruled that these two provisions merely helped the 
public authorities to influence the decisions and they were not granted exclusively in 
favor of them (implied an indirect control of the company through the combination of 
the two provisions).  
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The critical question was therefore: “how the Court would have decided if the 
Land had sold its shares in VW to private investors. Would the voting cap and the 
special majority rule still constituted an infringement of the Free Movement of 
Capital?”131 
According to some commentators and the ECJ (not clearly, but imliedly), the 
control exercised in the given case by public authorities would be more likely to deter 
possible investors from acquiring shares in the company than in case of a control 
exercised by a private investor. The opposite opinion that the decision-making process 
in a company is equally disturbed, irrespective of whether the actual beneficiary of the 
rules is a private person or a public body, is quite superficial. The reason is apparent: 
The State is more likely to exploit a company for non-profit making purposes 
hindering the decisions of the company and the interests of the investors.
132
 
Exemplifying the foregoing position we could refer the case of state aid, 
where the State is not allowed to grant loans under private law to companies, while 
loans granted by private investors in similar cases would not have qualified as “aid”. 
The conclusion is that in any case (both golden shares and state aid) the State is 
treated with more suspicion than private persons are.    
The above mentioned thesis is further strengthened by the outcome that AG 
Polares Maduro reached in Commission v Netherlands, namely that the fundamental 
freedoms impose obligations on Member-States regardless if they act in their 
capacity as public authority or entity under private law. They are subjected to 
them
133
 on the account of their organic capacity as signatories of the Treaty and thus 
are constrained by limitations that do not apply to other market participants.
134
 
The weak dimension of AG’s reasoning is that any State action based on 
public authority or not could qualify as national measure and subjected to the Free 
Movement of Capital if his thesis proved to be the case.
135
 But this weakness may 
well balanced at the second stage of assessment, namely if the national measure 
constitutes a restriction (deter possible investors).  
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The combination of the provisions (capping and voting) and the fact that the 
State owns a stake of shares which facilitates the control of the company leads in a 
legally well-founded, but incomplete conclusion, since the Court in the VW case 
touched upon the limits which EU Law places on Member States when they attempt 
to organize the internal affairs of their companies
136
 regardless if they acted as 
private entities or regular shareholders. 
The Court in the given case avoided to take a clear position on the 
question if it can review general company law provisions in any case (either States 
or private persons indirectly or directly benefited from them) taking merely the view 
that the two provisions of VW law indirectly benefited the State,
137
 without deciding 
anything in essence for private persons. Therefore, it seems that the Court regarded 
that it has the ability to review general company law provisions only if these 
rules directly or indirectly help public authorities to be benefited.  
Even if we can’t be sure of what will happen in the future with regard to 
private persons, directly or indirectly benefited from the provisions of general 
company law, the implied answer of the ECJ is currently negative
138
 regarding the 
ability of the latter to review the compatibility of  those provisions with the Free 
Movement of Capital. Nonetheless, the issue remains open and the scene seems 
vague. 
However, in my view the rules of general company law enacted through 
legislation (as in VW Law) which do not necessarily secure any prerogatives of the 
States and do not benefit the State in other way, but merely shape the relations 
between private persons can be subject to the Free Movement of Capital as the 
interpretation of another fundamental freedom indicated.
139
-very broad view of 
freedom’s applicability and ECJ’s scrutinizing power. The freedom applies equally to 
private persons relationships regulated through general company law provisions-. It is 
unrealistic to expect however that the ECJ will review the rules to a large extend since 
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the broad approach taken previously was eventually proven to be dysfunctional in its 
application (see Keck case).  
Hence, we should consider that the Golden Shares and the general company 
law provisions, which benefit directly
140
or indirectly either the State (through 
legislation or private provisions) or private persons can qualify as “national measures” 
and thus fall within the scope of the Free Movement of Capital
141
 irrespective of State 
(interests) involvement or not. Therefore, the ECJ is able at a second stage to 
scrutinize its effect in respect to deterrence to possible investors. Ultimately, once the 
Court regards that the scope of application of the Free Movement of Capital is too 
broad, it may alter its position either as in Keck case through its future case law or via 
the adoption of a stronger justification test.  
At this point we should underline another opinion which is argued by some 
commentators, as long as we regarded that the general company law provisions 
regulating the relationships between individuals fell within the scope of the Free 
Movement of Capital. According to them, general company law is predominantly 
concerned with the decision making process of the companies rather than market 
access to share capital. Consequently, if the ECJ reviewed general company law, it 
would assess most of them on the basis of the Freedom of Establishment. However, 
the question remains to be answered. 
According to my view as expressed above, a new criterion with regard to 
violation of the Free Movement of Capital is seen to emerge drawing attention to the 
degree that the measure at stake deters possible investors - effect based test - from 
investing in the company in a way comparable to Golden Shares, rather than the 
degree of state involvement. This approach, not only permits the court to apply 
different levels of scrutiny depending on the actor, the seriousness of the infringement 
and the validity of participants’ competing claims, but also seems to be in more 
compliance with article 63TFEU which refers nothing in its face to the State. 
Furthermore, the foregoing approach consolidates the scattered picture that 
the case-law presents. While company law measures by private parties are only 
exceptionally subject to the provisions of Free Movement of Capital, State measures 
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potentially always trigger the scope of application of this fundamental freedom, 
irrespective of their nature or objective. Secondly, so far the Court has predominantly 
seen the scope of application of the capital freedom triggered when the State is the 
beneficiary of the measure in question. Both criteria, however, have numerous 
exceptions, and it is difficult to see a clear underlying policy rationale. 
iv) A closer look at the Court’s reasoning as well as at the context in which 
this case has been decided sheds light on the dynamics between creating a 
European competitive business environment on the one hand and doing justice to 
the political choices at the Member State level on the other. The whole philosophy 
of the VW Law as expressed in the last fifty years during which it was in force, was 
based on a  compromise giving the capital owners, the Unions and the government a 
representative and co-deciding stake in Volkswagen with the effect of ‘protecting’ the 
company from the domination of one shareholder.  
However, the traditional national policies (like German in the post-war 
scene as documented by VW case) have not been found by the ECJ to provide a clear 
guidance towards future developments, employment and corporate law which are 
shaped in a totally different procedure based on a supranational law making process in 
these regimes, where a new model of corporate law is generated.   
To outline the context of the decision, it was issued in the light of increasing 
pressure on existing systems of corporate management and industrial relations, in 
particular Germany’s model of co-determination.142Such activities then are being 
pursued in a complex regulatory environment of domestic statutory law on the one 
hand which is under severe pressure to convergence
143
and of norms produced by 
transnational regulatory bodies on the other.
144
  
Having coincided with a wave of privatization of welfare systems and the 
tendency to base pension financing in capital markets, the VW decision encapsulates 
the challenge that stakeholder-oriented systems of corporate governance face as to 
their capacity to provide the transparency and management control necessary for their 
success in the global competition for stock market investments. 
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The outcome was clear and emphatic: Not only are the single market and a 
corporate governance (far from German standard and closer to the US) to be 
established free of any national restrictions, but also their creation is to be made at a 
supranational level. EU should be more competitive in the international context and 
the undertaking would have been completed by the combined contribution of negative 
(ECJ mainly) and positive integration (legislation).   
An opposite decision (of the ECJ in VW case) might have opened – for a final 
encore? – the curtain for the Rhenish model of capitalism, behind which government, 
corporations and unions are understood as partners in a market ordering exercise,
145
 
which was totally contrary to the philosophy of the EU in the current stage. 
Thus, the political signal from the Commission was clear and twofold: 
Member States cannot interfere with the running of their companies and therefore 
distorting competition, nor can they engage in economic nationalism and abuse tools 
in order to prevent foreign companies to enter their markets through takeovers.
146
   
v) The ambivalent opinion of the AG concerning art. 295 EC -345 TFEU-. 
Article 345 TFEU provides that “the Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in 
Member State’s governing the system of property ownership”. In contrast to his earlier 
Opinions in similar cases, AG Colomer rejected the applicability of Art. 345 TFEU in 
the context of Volkswagen Statute.
147
 
 According to his previously expressed opinions
148
Art. 345 TFEU would 
entitle Member States, when privatizing formerly state-owned undertakings to 
maintain extraordinary company rights by imposing Golden Share arrangements.  
The AG opined that if a Member State were free to decide whether an 
undertaking is either being fully privatized or socialized, Art. 345 TFEU must a 
fortiori offer the possibility to partly privatize, through the enactment of Golden 
Share arrangements (as a kind of “minus” to the complete privatization). Pursuant to 
this argument, Golden Share arrangements would have to be subsumed under the term 
“rules in Member State’s governing the system of property ownership” (Art. 345 
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TFEU) and, therefore, would fall outside of the realm of the EU Treaty.  What’s 
more, the AG Colomer based on the unconditional and forceful wording of the 
relevant provision (in no way) which is met in no other provision on the Treaty. 
In other words the AG adopting a teleological approach
149
 of this article rather 
than the economic one
150
 preferred by the Commission which argued that the 
movement of a firm from public to private hands is an economic policy choice falling 
within the exclusive competence of the Member State 344TFEU (ex 292EC), pointed 
out that the system of property ownership must extend to any State measure (and 
Golden Shares) which allows the State to contribute to the organization of the 
nation’s financial activity and therefore are to be respected by EU authorities and 
institutions.
151
 
The ECJ had consistently different opinion on the issue
152
 and the AG in the 
present case based on a different reasoning
153
 than the one in the foregoing cases
154
 
came to the same with the Court conclusion. Specifically, the Court regarded that 
Member States systems of ownership are not exempted from the application of the 
Treaty rules and fundamental freedoms
155
 citing one of its most important 
precedent
156
 on the issue to underline that Member States may exercise only the 
powers retained in compliance with the EU Law.  
As a result of article 295EC (345 TFEU) Member States are able to reserve 
activities to the public sector, but after the privatization of a company they have to 
pay attention to the competition rules regulated on EU level. This view, even not 
being explained in details was practically quite functional for the interpretation of 
EU law, since there were many provisions in the Treaties which could have inevitable 
effects on property rights and which thus could be exempted from the application of 
EU law through art 345 TFEU. 
157
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The drastic change in his interpretation of art 345 TFEU raised queries given 
the significance of the case, except if we regarded that the AG abandoned his 
interpretation taken in the first cases as the ECJ had rejected them repeatedly.
158
   . 
vi) The microeconomic impact of the special rights granted in VW case 
deserves distinct analysis, since Golden Shares except for the legal dimension have 
an additional economic one, which is of equal importance especially in practical 
results. 
The impact of Golden Shares is to be assessed in correlation with the 
performance of comparable -according to the experts’ opinion- (at least similar or 
identical) companies (size, operating markets, risks, regulatory regime etc) not subject 
to special rights over the same period of time. The possible comparators in case of 
VW were BMW (Germany), FIAT (Italy), FORD-MOTORS (USA) and others. 
Additionally, the researchers took into consideration the share price reactions of the 
company’s shares’ around specific events when the market learned that special rights 
arrangements might change and which were likely to affect the price of the shares was 
to be taken into consideration.
159
 
The report
160
focused on the performance of the company from 1995-2004 with 
the following conclusions: a. The financial performance of VW was detected in the 
average level as there were better and worse operators. b. Considering the annual 
accounting profitability VW was underperforming relative to the comparator average. 
c. The same conclusion was made in respect to labor productivity. d. The overall 
investment activity for VW was greater than the equivalent of its competitors. Finally, 
the production seemed more labor intensive and the result was consistent with the 
view that due to the existence of special rights, the company prioritized employment 
and growth at the expense of financial performance in the examined period.   
On the other hand, market reactions were observed in three different dates, 
namely the day of the referral to the ECJ, the day when the formal notice was made 
and the day of reasoned opinion’s delivery, indicating vague results in comparison to 
the foregoing. The overall outcome stemmed from market share prices fluctuation was 
that special rights in case of VW were not considered to have significantly negative 
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impact on the company’s performance. However, as remarked in the analysis this 
may occur due to methodological problems, rather than the absence of an actual 
negative impact since it is quite difficult to measure and isolate the critical economic 
consequences.   
vii) Some scholars argued that in VW case the Court implied that the “one 
share-one vote”161 principle stemmed from article 63 TFEU.162However, this fact 
was not proven to be the case.
163
 First of all, the capping of voting rights did not 
constitute by itself the restriction on the Free Movement of Capital, but only in 
combination with a majority of 80% of the represented shares. Secondly, the Court 
tested the legitimacy of the capping in favor of the State and not the legitimacy of the 
provision under general company law, where is arguably applicable as a recognized 
instrument of company law. Besides, the Court drew the line between a power 
available to shareholders who are free to decide whether they wish to use it or not and 
a specific obligation imposed on shareholders by way of legislation from which they 
could not derogate. Finally, it was underlined that a cap on voting rights may operate 
both to the benefit and the detriment of the shareholders depending on the perspective 
we confront the problem (majority or minority).
164
   
To sum up, one of Europe’s most visible symbols of economic protectionism 
had effectively been targeted by the Commission and the Court.
165
 The Volkswagen 
Decision of 23
rd
 of October 2007, is instantly emphasized as a milestone not only in 
Europe’s development of an open market, but also in the process of transformation of 
European company law regime. 
166
 
Trying to bear in mind the diversity of historically grown, socio-economic 
structures that gave rise to different company law regimes in the various Member 
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States, the decision issued in a period of legal and socio-economic debate of the way 
that corporate power is being exercised and that corporate boards are to be staffed and 
controlled. Volkswagen’s co-determination was at the central of the predicament, 
which was created from the competition between two models, which instead of 
complementing each other, have unfortunately been positioned in an oppositional and 
in fact competitive relation.  
Workers’ co-determination, as forming a constitutive part of the two-tier 
board structure in German stock corporations with more than 500 employees has been 
a constant target of review and polemics. In respect of this issue the ECJ took a clear 
view at the expense of the model followed in German and its more representative 
example was VW. This was the result of political compromises in Europe, where 
divergent cultures and legal approaches indicated a solution. 
What’s more, Europe wished to make clear in an emphatic may that crosses a 
transitional company law regime, whose direction favors open markets, abolishes the 
restrictions impeded direct investments and facilitate takeovers from investors even in 
strategic sectors (energy or automobile) no matter if they come from Germany, 
Greece or the US.  
      
VI. Golden Shares and Restrictions on Takeovers 
 
The strict control imposed on Golden Shares aims primarily at creating a level 
playing field within the EU and establishing a single market. The protected through 
Special Rights companies are removed from the class of potential targets, while they 
may still act as bidders.  
Trying to clarify the first point we could point out that the bidders will only 
pay a control premium when they have a plan on how to earn that premium 
back within a reasonable period of time. In some way they must expect the 
performance of the target corporation to be improved subsequent to their acquisition 
of control. Usually that expectation is based on a plan involving the use of their 
prospective control position to cause an improvement in the target's earnings. Such a 
plan will in most instances only be feasible if the acquisition of a majority of the share 
capital does indeed give the bidder the power to change the way the target corporation 
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is running its business. Where a bidder expects obstacles to the exercise of control, an 
acquisition becomes less attractive.
167
  
To illustrate the economic risks that perspective investors undertake in 
acquiring or merging with these companies, European governments repeatedly have 
taken advantage of the threat of Golden Shares’ power in order to oppose to possible 
takeovers as in the case of a takeover bid for Cimpor, a Portuguese cement 
company which was opposed by the Portuguese government
168
or in case of 
Telefonica where considerable pressure was exerted by the Spanish government in 
order to breakdown the takeover by the  Dutch KPN.   
If there are many such obstacles in some parts of the EU, but few in others a 
prohibition on frustrating action in a European Takeover Directive might indeed 
intensify the already existing inequalities in the strategic positions of potential 
bidders and targets from different Member States. While target companies having 
Golden Shares prerogatives will have more defenses at their disposal against a hostile 
bidder, the companies which do not grant any Golden Shares will have only a limited 
number of defenses against the bidder and therefore they will be unable to resist. The 
threat for a distortion of competition is apparent.
169
  
 The foregoing fear is ascertained when the shareholders are not allowed to 
transfer their shares freely, to change or determine the articles of association of the 
company or to replace the inefficient management.
 
In general, all similar situations 
which could impede the independent running of the company result in the distortion 
of competition. Therefore the use of “Golden Shares” should be restricted in such 
a way that allows the privatized enterprises to operate and control 
independently.  This is the only way to accept them as legitimate and permissible 
instrument for privatizations.
170
 
Besides, Golden Share arrangements directly restricting strategic investors, 
who are predominantly interested in acquiring the control of a company, almost 
invariably have an impact on the market for portfolio investments. Where national 
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laws deter a bidder form acquiring control over a corporation the potential target's 
shareholders are deprived from an opportunity to dispose of their portfolio 
investments.
171
A takeover bid is usually an exceptionally attractive opportunity to do 
so because bidders pay premiums above market prices. Where there is no potential 
market for corporate control, the market for non-controlling stock is therefore also 
affected.  
Nonetheless, a possible frustration of this effort results not only from 
"Golden Share" arrangements which specifically apply to individual (recently 
privatized) corporations. It also results from elements of general corporate law of a 
Member State if it provides for a deviation from the principle according to which 
control rights should only be carried by share capital participating in the residual risk 
and that such share capital "should carry control rights in proportion to the risk 
carried."
172
 
Thus, although Golden Share arrangements constitute only a small fraction of 
the legal obstacles that stand in the way of the creation of a level playing field in this 
part of the common market, they may affect possible takeovers in various ways.  
However, the predominant ways adopted from the Commission to 
facilitate takeovers within the EU and curtail the powers granted through Golden 
Shares were the non-frustration and the breakthrough rule of 2004/25/EC Directive. 
Article 11 -breakthrough rule- of the Directive lays down that any 
restrictions on the transfer of securities or voting rights provided for in the articles of 
association of the offeree company or in contractual agreements between the offeree 
company and the holders of its securities or in contractual agreements between 
holders of the offeree company’s securities, shall not apply vis-à-vis the offeror 
during the time allowed for acceptance of the bid. (paragraph3). Nonetheless, this rule 
does not apply to Golden Shares, since paragraph 5 of the article provides that 
equitable compensation should be conferred when loss is suffered by the holders of 
special rights which are broken through (paragraph 5).  
The final approach taken by Europeans is contrary to the Report of 10/01/2002 
issued before the adoption of the Directive due to the objections raised by the 
                                                          
171
 Special Rights of Public Authorities In Privatized EU Companies: The Microeconomic Impact, 
Report prepared for the European Commission, November 2005 (Oxera) 
172
 Report of the High Level Group of Company Experts On Issued Related To Takeover Bids, 
10/01/2002, Brussels 
54 
 
 
Parliament
173
 and practically protects the holders of Golden Shares bringing down the 
attempt to restrict Golden Shares powers through secondary EU law. A step was 
taken forward, since special rights cannot typically constitute a substantial barrier in 
the procedure of takeovers (art. 11), practically though the results are considerably 
limited as the bidder has to compensate the holders of those rights in exchange for 
their inability to take advantage of their special powers and impede or object to a 
takeover. 
 The Report states the following:  
“(…)if a formerly state-owned company is privatized and enjoys the benefits 
provided by the capital market, it should be subject to the same principles of company 
law and capital market law as other companies.” Additionally, the Group reckoned 
that the breakthrough rule should also apply so as to override special control rights 
attached to golden shares held by Member States, even if the European Court of 
Justice would rule they do not violate the Treaty of Rome as such.
174
 The Report, also 
stated that there is no justification for distinguishing between companies in which 
special control rights are held by private persons and companies where special 
control rights are held by States. Besides, that a successful bidder who has acquired a 
substantial part of the risk bearing capital in the general bid for all the shares of the 
company should have the ability to breakthrough any mechanisms which frustrate the 
exercise of proportionate control.
175
 
Article 9 (2) –non frustration rule-, embedding the principle of neutrality, of 
the Directive refers that the prior authorization of the General Meeting of shareholders 
is required before any action on behalf of the target’s board, which could result in the 
frustration of the bid. Thus, any action of the appointed directors, -deriving from 
Golden Shares prerogatives- of the target company requires the prior authorization of 
the General Meeting of the company. The foregoing rule rests upon the principle that 
a takeover bid is made to the shareholders and,consequently it is up to shareholders to 
decide on defensive measures. 
The “one share –one vote” principle is partially (as we see subsequently) 
implemented and multiple voting rights are declared inactive at the first General 
Meeting of shareholders following the closure of the bid, called by the offeror in order 
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to amend the articles of association or to remove or appoint board members’. The 
bidder has the right to convene a special post-breakthrough meeting in order to 
strengthen his controlling position in the target company (article 9 paragraph 4).  
All deviations from the proportionate allocation of control rights among the 
risk bearing shareholders are to be suspended once a takeover bid is announced. This 
means that in the shareholders' assembly which must, under the group's proposal, pass 
a resolution on the authorization of defenses subsequent to the announcement of the 
bid, all shareholders will have voting powers in proportion to their share in the capital 
bearing the residual risk. Limited voting rights, multiple voting rights, caps on the 
exercise of voting rights, allocations of voting rights to non-risk bearing investors and 
similar arrangements would thus be suspended.
176
 
However, the attempt to formulate an harmonized legal regime in takeovers 
within the EU is considerably blurred by article 12 of the Takeover Directive. 
Member-States are free to opt out from the neutrality principle laid down in the 
Directive or permit their undertakings to opt into initially and opt out again, since they 
became the subject of an offer launched by a company which does not apply the same 
provisions. In final analysis, given the current legal status, Member States are 
completely free to create shares with multiple voting rights provided that they 
are compatible with article 56 TFEU in order to prevent hostile takeovers. 
VII. Conclusive Comments 
 
i. The first decisions of the ECJ handed down in the early 2000s formulated 
the general framework for scrutinizing future Golden Share infringements. The 
Portugal case clarified that purely economic and financial objectives cannot 
sufficiently justify the restrictions imposed on capital flows, the French one defined 
the vague concept of proportionality, which is the predominant tool to review these 
kinds of infringements and the Belgian case made clear that under certain conditions 
special shares afforded to State enterprises can be proved compatible with the EU 
Law. In all the subsequent cases the ECJ followed these fundamental rules set in the 
first cases decided by the Court.
177
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ii. The time period when the Court rendered its initial decisions is of pivotal 
importance. There were many States wishing to join the EU some of which were ex 
communists and the remainder from their early history had to be abolished (extended 
direct or indirect public control) in order to fulfill the criteria for their accession. 
Thus, they had to comply with the rules of the EU Law among of which the Free 
Movement of Capital was included and the recent case law was a kind of “warning” 
for them and their route to accession. For example, Romania had initiated proceedings 
to privatize SNP Petrom, which operated in petroleum and gas sectors, and expressed 
the hope to create Golden Shares in the privatized company, but it should take 
seriously into consideration the rulings of the ECJ (mainly the Belgian one) in order 
to craft a form of shares acceptable and compatible with the EU Law.
178
 
iii. The ECJ took a rather broad view of the term “national measures” which 
can scrutinize in a permissible way under the fundamental freedoms. Legislative 
measures taken by national authorities even if they merely reproduce a private law 
contract and acts of the State performed through company law provisions certainly 
qualify as national measures. However, the question of whether only the measures 
benefiting the State or general company law provisions applicable to private 
shareholders too can amount to a national measure or not, remain unresolved.   
Arguably, some authors spoke about “horror iuris”, as a whole range of 
national private and contract law might be reviewed in the future on the foregoing 
basis. Therefore, the Court through its jurisprudence may confine the scope of the 
provisions which can be review.  
One option could be to scrutinize only the provisions granting special rights 
to public entities without the consent of the affected party. Or the mandatory 
provisions of company law which empower private law subjects to make an 
investment less attractive.  
Another option is to review only the special rights granted in company’s 
shares traded on an internationally accessible public market, which render the 
investment less attractive and hinder cross-border transactions. This perspective is 
even restrictive for the scope of application of Golden Share cases. In the second case 
an additional element should be taken into consideration, namely the severity of the 
restriction on shareholders’ right. 
                                                          
178
 C-503/99 paragraph 44 
57 
 
 
iv. The rationale behind the broad interpretation of the term restriction 
predisposes us for a wider impact of these decisions on general company law. 
“National rules that limit investment decisions of third parties or that curtail their 
shareholder rights, have a restrictive effect - according to the ECJ decisions - if two 
conditions are met: the rules must create a risk (including a potential, but still 
perceptible risk)
179
 that, because of these rules, some investors do not trade in those 
shares; and a cross-border effect must as well be possible”.  
The Commission took a clear view in favor of the creation of a single 
market and nothing can prevent it from applying the reasoning of Golden Shares 
judgments into general company law in the future. The Free Movement of Capital 
might therefore be restricted by all company law provisions that potentially make an 
investment in listed companies substantially less attractive. The VW decision 
intensified those concerns which still exist despite the lack of any subsequent decision 
to affirm those assumptions. 
v. The Golden Share decisions are primarily founded on the legal basis of the 
Free Movement of Capital which until mid 90s was considered to be useful only for 
tax cases. Not only did they make this fundamental freedom widely known and 
legally accessible in the European legal order, but also they made quite clear the fact 
that as, happens to be the case with the other three freedoms, the Free Movement of 
Capital is directly applicable to persons and therefore to possible investors, who can 
be protected efficiently though its application. No further European completion could 
be achieved without the implementation of the standards laid down by the Free 
Movement of apital.   
Furthermore, the foregoing freedom was consistently regarded the exclusive 
(practically) legal basis for reviewing Golden Share arrangements until the issuance 
of C-326/07, when the ECJ and some scholars partially reconsidered the excusive 
applicability of the freedom with respect to veto rights. The Court ruled that for this 
class of Golden Shares the sole legal basis is that of article 49 TFEU, limiting the 
broad scope of article 63 TFEU. 
However, this conclusion is to be reaffirmed from future decisions in other 
Golden Share issues, such as the right of the State to appoint one or more supervisory 
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directors (The criterion is that the Freedom of Establishment relates to decisions 
falling within the scope of management of the company). 
Once the conclusion is ascertained, the case law may move towards a 
situation, where both freedoms will apply in cases relating to access to the share 
capital of the company, while the Freedom of Establishment will apply exclusively to 
Golden Shares directly linked with the decision  making process of a company.           
vi. Golden Share decisions removed significant obstacles for the ratification of 
an EU Takeover Directive. These obstacles existed from 1985 when the Commission 
expressed at an initial stage its will to establish a common framework for the EU 
single market abolishing the national provisions which are incompatible with the EU 
Law
180
. The foregoing longtime obstacles were supported by the Germans until 2003, 
even during the negotiations for the drafting of the proposal of the Takeover Directive 
in order to prevent its national big industries from takeovers. Finally, with the 
contribution of the case law and the manifestation of the clear will of the Commission 
to establish an internal market free from any restrictions, the Directive on Takeover 
Bids was adopted on 21
st
 April 2004 and the differences among Member States were 
bridged. 
vii. The rulings of the ECJ were only a fraction of the conclusive action 
taken by the Commission to bring down the barriers existing in the internal market 
such as the Second Banking Directive, Transparency Directive, Market Abuse 
Directive, Takeovers and Mergers Directives. However, the abolition of Golden 
Shares was attained through the implementation of primary EU fundamental freedoms 
and the jurisprudence of the ECJ.  
The underlying reasoning behind the disallowance of the majority of uses of 
special rights could well be applied to other protectionist and defensive measures 
in the future, because it was clear that the Court relies on its previous case law when 
faces new challenges. This approach was confirmed by the ruling issued in VW case. 
Without the framework developed by the ECJ, an essential aspect of the continuing 
process of market liberalization in the EU would be called into question. 
viii. The Court through its case law clarified the scope of public security 
exception, the justification of public policy and the applicability of the 
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proportionality principle in practical issues which could be proven useful in cases of 
different nature. Public policy exception is invoked in most cases by States to justify 
infringements on human rights and even when it is permissible, we should esteem the 
severity of the infringement in correlation with the pursued objective and the 
existence of less restrictive measures to attain it. The clarification of those terms 
contributed to the establishment of a more transparent and predictable framework in 
respect of Member States’ capability to impose certain restrictions. 
However, the ECJ did not reach sufficient standards concerning the 
permissible justifications of the conditions making the public interest exception 
proportionate under the EU Law. Not only did not rule precisely on what constitutes a 
permissible exception to the fundamental freedom, but also reached in some cases in 
unconvincing outcomes. For example, in case of Italy ruled that there is no sufficient 
connection between the adopted criteria and the special powers granted in favor of the 
State, pointing out that the criteria were formulated in general and abstract terms and 
the objective lacked specificity.
181
Contrary to the Italian case, in the Belgiam one 
ruled that the ex post authorization procedure prescribed by the relevant law met the 
required legal elements (without further examination of those elements in depth) and 
therefore was compatible with the European Law.
182
The same conclusion was 
adopted in case of France v Commission, where the Court dismissed the criteria as 
imprecise, not necessary and disproportionate.
183
     
The ECJ merely declared (in Belgium case) the criteria suitable and 
proportionate without comparing them with the Italian or French one or giving more 
precise guidelines on the permissible degree of discretion left in the State.
184
 The 
same applied in case of Spain, where the Court ruled that the State failed to clarify 
the risks that the investors run, the time when the risks could possibly arise
185
 and the 
limits of the discretionary power exercised by the regulatory authority.
186
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 ix. Prior authorization was required in many cases
187
 in order to permit an 
investor, for example, to acquire more than a certain threshold of shares (cap) or to 
take decisions on specific matters and constituted one of the fundamental issues in the 
series of Golden Share cases which were dealt in an explicitly hostile way by the ECJ.  
The four-step test as determined by the Communication of the Commission on 
intra EU investments (1997) and the Gebhard case had to be fulfilled in order to 
render the authorization legitimate. The view taken by the Court was consistently 
expressed in previous cases
188
 concerning restrictions imposed on the Free Movement 
of Capital, even not relating to Golden Shares.  
However, the criteria that the Court took into consideration in both categories 
of cases were the same and all the schemes based on prior authorization were 
regarded to be illegitimate and disproportionate. The ECJ in virtually all the cases 
regarded that despite the legitimacy of public policy reasons invoked by the States, 
they are not suitable or necessary or proportionate to attain the pursued objective. 
Namely, according to the ECJ, there was no sufficient link between the objectives and 
the measures, the invoked conditions lacked specificity and accuracy, the discretion 
given to the States was too wide, there were no effective legal remedies etc.     
Besides, often argues that there are less restrictive measures than prior 
authorization such as the imposition of public service obligations to ensure the 
security of energy supply
189
or the introduction of a prior mandatory notification 
regime which cannot block the performance of the pending transactions. 
x. Article 26 TFEU provides that The Union shall adopt measures with the 
aim of establishing or ensuring the functioning of the internal market in accordance 
with the relevant provisions of the Treaties. Also, the internal market shall comprise 
an area without internal frontiers in which the Free Movement of Goods, Persons, 
Services and Capital are ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties.  
To comply with these fundamental provisions the EU has tried to establish, 
since its creation, a common single market liberalizing various aspects among of 
which the Free Movement of Capital is listed. “(…) In fact, it can be said that 
liberalization in the European Union has mainly been an unavoidable consequence of 
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the establishment of the internal market. It is obvious that a market based on 
competition and free circulation of goods, services, people and capital is at odds with 
systems based on national monopolies. Our liberalization policy was therefore 
conceived as an indispensable instrument for the establishment of the internal 
market”.190 
Szyszczak expressed another dimension of the above mentioned position 
pointing out that: “the transfer of State assets to the private sector is seen as an 
essential component of the processes of European integration, becoming one of the 
tacit criteria for successful accession to the European Union”.  
However, in its typical terms States are free to decide whether they will 
privatize or not. Reducing the scope of the public sector is definitely considered as an 
advantage which allows improvement of the development and growth of the 
competition stage of the market, since results in the minimization of bureaucracy, the 
reduction of budgetary costs, the increase of state income through the income earned 
from the purchase of the previously state-owned shares 
The European Court of Justice found the proper balance between the 
requirements of a common market in the EU, the legitimate interests of investors 
acquiring shares in privatized companies and the protection of the general interest of 
the Member States. Golden Shares are still retained in some legal form by 
Member States, they have not evaporated and they may have a future in the EU 
only within the framework established by the ECJ.  
VIII. Remarks for the Future 
 
i. Failure of protectionism. Increasing evidence indicates that the PE’s 
draining resources from pubic treasury either cannot perform their social functions 
efficiently or cannot contribute significantly to the development of the State’s 
economy, even in cases where the State is a minority shareholder with increased and 
disproportionate powers to its holding.  
The reason which makes even the privatized companies equipped with Golden 
Shares likely to fail in the long term in the economic field is apparent and historically 
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present, namely the inherent limitations of State ownership. Classically, States 
exercised the rights retained in companies even in the form of Golden Shares with the 
inherent risk of political interference and corruption. 
Even though the Court’s jurisprudence seems consistent and straightforward, 
some comments are to be made on the adoption of Golden Shares, especially at a time 
when the excess liberalization of the economy shows some limits and may support an 
argument for the reuse of this instrument. More and more States affected by the 
impacts of the recent economic crisis which for some is regarded to be the result of 
the excess liberalization may rethink the possibility of retaining special rights in 
strategic sectors for reasons of public policy.  
In other words, the maintenance of Golden Shares may be the result of their 
usefulness as a defensive measure at the disposal of Member States as a mechanism 
by which the government can protect its national interests against more powerful State 
owned enterprises operating in the same sector in another State located either in or 
outside the EU.
191
 Public interest concept may be taken advantage fully by States to 
this end and the stronger are the invoked “public policy” reasons, the more 
determining will be the pursued role of the State.
192
 
However, this approach overlooks some of the steps taken the last twenty 
years in order to endorse single market and make it feasible. Besides, adopts a 
protectionist economic approach based on beliefs of national sovereignty, which is at 
odds with the supranational belief upon which the EU was established. New 
reservations or hesitations in other (non crucial) economic sectors may be expressed 
by certain States, unless the Court and the Commission proved to have robust opinion 
on certain critical issues concerning common market, such as Golden Shares. Finally, 
privatizations proved to be quite helpful for the EU States for various reasons and any 
position in favor of the implicit legitimacy of Golden Shares may lead in 
nationalizations and adverse impacts detrimental to the States.    
In any case, the recent crisis made quite clear the fact that markets cannot be 
left completely unregulated, but instead they need to be in line with certain rules 
safeguarding the security, transparency and performance of its operation. Thus, under 
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the pressure of the foregoing problems we cannot pass at the opposite edge, namely to 
strengthen the position of States in markets.  
States have turned out to be detrimental for the performance of the companies 
involved being susceptible to corruption and mismanagement, creating overstaffed 
companies for political reasons, increasing the inflexible bureaucracies, 
derationalising the structure of the companies and being in final analyses loss makers 
than revenue generators.  
Revitalizing legally the validity of Golden Shares or setting more flexible 
criteria for their application/adoption we would definitely breach the discipline within 
the EU acquired so difficulty the last 15 years and would open the Pandora’s box for 
further protectionism and more powers retained by States in the name of the 
protection of a rather vague and ambiguous term of “public interest’.        
The speech
193
 of the former Commissioner for the internal market, Frits 
Bolkenstein, remains modern noting as regard the opposition of the Commission in 
the special shares arrangements that: “it is directed against a purchase from another 
Member State. A law which has the same discriminatory effect also contravenes the 
Treaty of Rome. It is not the instrument that counts, but the intent. The only exceptions 
to this rule are those expressly and restrictively provided for in the Treaty itself. The 
Treaty does not recognize the principle of reciprocity or the right of Member States to 
take retaliatory measures against each other. Furthermore, non-discriminatory 
measures are only admitted where there are imperative requirements in the general 
interest, as long as such measures are proportionate and limited in time”. 
ii. States in the markets. The jurisprudence stressed the fact that States 
are not ready enough to act as private actors shedding more light on the designation of 
the extent of Member States’ power to act in their private capacity, the extent to 
which EU Treaties apply to Member States acting as private persons, the extent to 
which may enter into relationships with other parties that are not of a regulatory 
nature. 
Nonetheless, even if States were ready to act in their private capacity, their 
effects might be indirectly regulatory rather than participatory (the motivation for a 
                                                          
193
 Speech/ 01/373, 07/09/2001, in the annual forum “Intelligence 2001 on the World, on Europe, on 
Italy”, Frits Bolkenstein  
64 
 
 
traditional private actor is to invest and maximize its profit). Thus, rules applicable to 
private actors might not be available to States acting as private entities.   
The distinction is between an action which can be characterized as private and 
that which is sovereign and regulatory, albeit indirectly.
194
 The criterion is the nature 
of the pursued private activity (regulatory or purely financial) and the framework is 
parity between State and private investors. All the motives, but an interest in 
profitability are suspect for the ECJ.
195
 The suspicions increase when the State seeks 
private activity within the domestic market and is treated as public entity even if its 
participation seems to be equivalent to that of a private investor. 
The outcome elaborated through Golden Shares case law is quite clear: States 
can engage in market activities for their own account, their activity though because of 
its public character (States can regulate their position as shareholder) appears to be 
presumptively regulatory to the extent it would affect the willingness or ease of 
transactions in those shares by nationals or other Member States.
196
  
States were found to act in European markets intending to regulate them 
instead of seeking to maximize their profit and thus their facially private activity was 
rendered public in its substance. That presumption could be rebutted only if a State 
convinced the EU that its actions are private in nature, in form and fact. The 
jurisprudence indicates that path. If its role is purely financial and participatory, then 
Commission may turn its view.  
The above mentioned conclusion becomes more conceivable if we consider 
that Golden Shares decisions rendered as a part of a conclusive legal context which 
aimed at the unification of European markets and was based on the effort of both the 
Commission and the ECJ to establish a level playing field in competition within the 
EU. To attain this objective the first step to be taken was the abolition of Special 
Rights granted in favor of States which distorted considerably the competition 
through their regulatory operation. This target is regarded to have been achieved 15 
years after the issuance of first Golden Share decision. 
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Now, a final step is to be taken, namely to accept States in markets operations 
as private actors seeking, for instance, to purchase shares in the domestic or foreign 
market or to acquire special rights. The States wishing to act like corporations, as 
other non-governmental organizations, call for the protection and the advantages 
afforded through private law in the pursuance of non-sovereign activities in a 
predetermined regulatory framework. The adoption of the proposed approach requires 
the incorporation of public authorities as private actors in private law with public 
effects across borders. 
The consequence is of pivotal importance as States will be subjected to the 
same constraints and privileges as private actors. The argument that States, abstractly 
and generally, can legislate for its own interest is reasonable, but “weak”, since if we 
adopted this thesis, then we would deal suspiciously every transaction where a State 
was involved. Another argument, that is a State as a political body can never act to 
maximize its welfare, because it cannot duplicate the internal construction of a private 
entity, worth consideration. 
The foregoing position -final step- is well implemented in the US and the EU 
may take it as an example to elaborate a new framework. In the US, States are free to 
act in private markets and to further their interests within the law. Private law applies 
in these cases and States will be treated as regulators only when acting through 
Statute. Thus, the private activities of States are not subject to special limitations and 
private law applies to such activities. 
This approach may seem for the present to go too far, but at some point the 
Europeans have to confront this tension. Golden Share cases and contemporary 
transnationalization of corporate law provide an excellent window for taking a 
revolutionary approach in the EU in respect of the foregoing issue. However, 
Europeans should get rid of the reluctance of their States to let go of their direction of 
certain sectors of economic activity. After the consolidation of inadmissibility of 
Golden Shares, they should take long distance to attain the proposed liberal approach.  
However, this is the open question pending for answer in the future and not 
the re-establishment of Golden Shares in an admissible and protectionist legal context. 
iii. Takeover regime and the breakthrough rule. In my opinion, 
irrespective of whether we consider the adoption of the breakthrough rule and the 
principle of “one share-one vote” for listed companies optimal for the EU market, a 
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harmonized solution is to be taken by Member States in respect to the 
applicability of BTR. The rationale is quite clear, namely to establish a level playing 
field within the EU in the takeover regime, since voting caps and multiple voting 
rights are granted in most Golden Share cases in order to prevent hostile 
takeovers. 
The breakthrough rule is based on the reasoning that the successful bidder 
should be able to breakthrough any mechanisms which frustrate the exercise of 
proportionate control,
197
 such as the voting caps, multiple or double voting rights and 
voting rights attributed to non-risk bearing capital. The ultimate decision lays always 
in the hands of the general meeting.  
The breakthrough rule does not apply to Golden Shares either they are 
provided by the articles of association, like the UK, or by national law, like France 
and Italy (11 para.7) as long as they are compatible with the Treaties. If not, then 
the Special Rights are caught by the breakthrough rule (as happens in the majority of 
the cases except for the Belgium one).If yes, then paragraph 5 of article 11 applies 
and equitable compensation must be provided for the holders of those Special 
Securities. What’s more, an extended disclosure obligation is provided through article 
10 paragraphs 1a and d, where all deviations from “one share-one vote” principle 
must be disclosed.
198
  
The rule established through the Takeover Directive as the result of capital 
market development and the growing influence of institutional investors is mostly 
idealistic rather than efficient. The reason is the ability of Member States to opt out 
from the relevant provision though article 12 generating negative impacts on the 
attempt made by Europeans to establish a level playing field within the EU. For 
example Italy and Germany forbid by law the issuance of multiple voting shares, 
while Sweden adopts this option as a typical one for its corporate governance (the 
same applies in case of France).
199
 Besides, in the same Member State some Golden 
Shares, such as multiple voting rights are prohibited, whereas others such as voting 
caps are permitted.  
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Thus, the partial adoption of the breakthrough rule within the same State or 
within the EU States in general as outlined above leads in a scattered picture within 
the EU, which is to be brought down in a harmonized level. The secondary 
legislation referred to above is still indispensable in order to ensure a level playing 
field. Once again we should point out that the primary reasoning underlining the 
adoption of Golden Shares was to prevent hostile takeovers of strategic companies.  
iv. Alternatives to Golden Shares. The robust case law of the ECJ 
indicates that only a hostile solution is to be taken by Member States. However, in the 
light of the foregoing thoughts and the economic crisis, still there are alternatives at 
the disposal of States to maintain the effects of Golden Shares and attain their 
pursued purposes, which are fully compatible with the EU Law.  
Firstly, States can maintain their influence by retaining significant or 
controlling shareholdings in the companies they privatize. Secondly, States can serve 
their public policy objectives through regulation of corporate activity and 
competition, especially in public utility sectors such as gas, telecoms, electricity, 
either by provisions which impose strict tendering, prudential, production or supply 
conditions or by national authorities (Regulators), which monitor the compliance with 
those conditions.
200
Regulatory authorities are distinct entities from governments, 
equipped with an increased degree of independence. What’s more, the regulatory 
framework might have already been established at EU level, whose results are 
evaluated on a standard basis by EU organ indicating updates when is necessary.
201
 
An indicative example of an alternative mechanism to Golden Shares in a 
given sector is the system for takeovers adopted in the UK, where unwelcome 
takeovers can be prevented by a merger reference made by the UK government to the 
UK Competition Commission. The UK government is capable of issuing an 
intervention notice in case of mergers that have public interest implication even there 
is no potential effect of a merger reference on competition.  
These alternatives should be taken seriously into consideration because in my 
opinion, the impact of the ECJ judgments practically will be the following: In non-
vital industries to which no key role in a hypothetical crisis can be assigned Member 
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States will as a rule find it difficult to implement any form of "golden share" 
arrangements that meet the standards established by the Court. In vital industries, by 
contrast, Member States will have to take great care to identify exactly which aspects 
of the activities of an enterprise they need to control. They will then have to devise a 
transparent legal mechanism clearly restricted to these aspects. Defense, energy and 
public health appear to be the main sectors where this is feasible. However, the 
restrictions will be assessed on a case by case basis.
202
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